


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6 APRIL 1990



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ALBANIA

Current Political Situation Analyzed

90EB0209C Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
21 Jan 90 p 7

[Article by Aleksandar Tijanic: "The Effect of the Whip"]

[Text] There is a simple calculation going around: If Albania first officially renounced all the gods—introducing atheism as the state religion, then all those gods have officially renounced Albania. At this point, at least so it appears, someone has changed his mind! However, the whole theory of the modern world as a "global village" comes crashing down when one asks what is actually happening in that country. Albania is right here across the way, yet no one can say with certainty whether there have been disturbances in it; if there have been, how large they were; were weapons used in stifling the rebellion, and how many dead were there in this most recent action to defend Bolshevism?

Our excellent administration, that of the government and the single party, takes a very diplomatic posture, fearing on the one hand that it might make an unforgivable international faux pas, while on the other it is deathly afraid of a repetition of the Romanian story, when we saved face at the cost of human life. During that time, our newspapermen waited for truck drivers at border checkpoints and put them through a severe cross examination. There is, of course, only one question: Are we witnessing yet another miracle, when the whip, once it has been set in motion, produces a crack in Albania, a backlash of "socialism"? While such a question is mainly philosophical in nature for the entire world—will Europe be left without a single Stalinist Tibet, for us it could be one of the crucial questions of the next decade.

That is, for all the force of the ideological debates with the "Yugoslav revisionists," the squabbles back and forth have never exceeded the limits of "murdering" TV and radio signals. Ramiz Alia, who has been ruling the hill folk since 1985, faced, however, the exhaustion of the formula with which Enver Hoxha had kept the Albanians in line: a bit with the Russians, then against them; a bit with the Chinese, then a bit without them! The analysts record xenophobia toward "Titoism" as the only constant of Albanian socialism over the last four decades. All that is left for Alia today is to issue an appeal for the "preservation of socialism," which in a citizenry consisting one-third of adolescents, faithful watchers, by the nature of things, of Italian, Greek, and Yugoslav television, evokes apathetic smiles, or—to radicalize Albanian public opinion by directing it toward Yugoslavia because of the "oppression of the brothers in Kosovo."

No one can say with a reasonable modicum of certainty where the limits are to Alia's readiness to capitalize on the ethnic sentiments of Albanians or to what sort of recklessness all this could lead. But at the same time, a majority of the Albanian opposition groups in the world

known up to this point disparage Alia not only because of his Stalinism, but also, at a different level, because of his "ineffectiveness" in offering "protection to the Albanians in Kosovo." This is obvious from the last interview of the claimant to the Albanian throne. So, even if the present administration, which is keeping its people in socialist feudalism, should fall before the anger of the "eagles," it is possible that behind the democratic mask—and in Eastern Europe this is already evident in some places—militant nationalists could come to power that would use different means in supporting a possible plan to unify the Albanian nationality in a single state.

Under normal circumstances, Albania would never represent any serious military threat to Yugoslavia. But our state is living now under abnormal circumstances, so that the very discussion of exactly who is ready to defend it and to what extent may offer some ambitious neighbor, over its head in domestic problems, a pretext to seek a bit of domestic peace through an external, direct, and perhaps even armed, conflict.

Another possibility, of course, is that the changes in Tirana might truly be democratic and liberal, might result in Albania opening up toward Europe and in a normalization of our mutual relations. That kind of Albania, along with a redesigning of the Yugoslav system, would offer healthy opportunities for some kind of final solution in Kosovo. As it is, we certainly do not belong among the world champions of the preservation of human rights, but it is comical that in international circles we should be given lectures on this by Albanians when to depart for Albania is not to make a trip through space, but through time!

So long as it remains that way, so long as it puts "full employment," "equality with an income spread of 1:3," and "price stability" in its "display window," so long as Albanianism is the only religion allowed, instead of Islam, Catholicism, and Orthodoxy, that Stalinist Tibet will seem irresistibly attractive to some of our Albanians. Our own primitive propaganda about the "number of refrigerators" and "automobiles" in Kosovo has proven to be inferior to the call of the ethnic muses. But it is an irrefutable fact that the entire strategy toward Albania exhausted itself waiting for Enver Hoxha to die, [...] devised on the anti-Tito principle, so that relations between the two states would be automatically ironed out. That is why Kosovo was left to "natural development," which later proved to be the detonator cap that resulted in a change in Yugoslavia's character.

For people who have been to Albania, and as a country it is an island, it is difficult to believe in the possibility of a large-scale rebellion that would result in a change of the system. This simply is not in the nature of these people, who are very industrious and kind and who will cordially utter as many words of Serbian as they know. The scenario of a conspiracy in the top leadership, accompanied by revolver shots which up to now have eliminated "Russian," "Chinese," and "Yugoslav friends," sounds

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incomparably more authentic. In any case, Alia has already moved from his orthodox stance and waded into revisionist waters by mentioning "output," "quality," and "innovation." What is more, it seemed last year that he was opening the door to Greece, but that plan fell through when the Greek refugees from his paradise demonstrated.

I sincerely hope that our leaders have a ready plan as to how to behave in a possible unraveling of Albanian agitation; the Albanians have one, since they make a strict distinction among our republics by drawing a line which is closest to the "internal Yalta." If the rumors about disturbances prove exaggerated or, more accurately, premature, there can be no talk whatsoever about an Albanian perestroika on the basis of the fact that in all the elections only one and the same negativist has been voting against the candidates of the party and the plan is in the upcoming elections to enlarge the opposition by all of 100 percent. However, what omnipotent plans cannot foresee is the outcome of the struggle between the dead Enver Hoxha and the live Albanians who would like to see whether the world which they see on foreign television programs is actually real.

Two years ago, when I saw the logo of the heavy metal rock group AC/DC chalked on a bunker in Durres, I knew that Alia's days were numbered. Much like when plastic raincoats reached our country from Trieste.

Treatment of Minorities Questioned

90EB0209D Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
21 Jan 90 pp 9-10

[Article by Stevan Stanic: "Night as Relief"]

[Text] Once awakened by the sudden spectacular fall of Nicolae Ceausescu's dictatorship in Romania some days ago, the French, Belgian, and Swiss press, which mostly had been protective up until that point, turned its columns over to the desperate appeals of alliances of Albanians there for Western diplomacy to finally set in motion a campaign against the harsh Stalinist regime of Tirana and commenced protests against the "clique" of Hoxha's widow Nedzmija and her pal Ramiz Alia. At the same time, as if by agreement, there arrived from the Greek press the description of the truly medieval drawing and quartering of the four Prasos brothers, who because of an attempt to flee from the "Marxist-Leninist paradise of Albania" were tied with ropes to a tractor and dragged and tortured through the villages and cities until they died.

The Undiplomatic Strauss

With an uncustomary voracity and speed—also uncustomary concerning events from neighboring Albania—our own press also carried all of these reactions and has continued to follow the sad fate of the 400,000 Greeks who live in Albania, forgetting for the moment, as if by gentleman's agreement, that the population there also includes 120,000 or 100,000 or 60,000 (or, according to

Albanian statistics, 100) of our own people, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Macedonians.

Since along with all this the news also leaked through that there had been an attempted rebellion in Skadar and "certain other cities," newsmen were sent to the border checkpoints Bozaj and Cafasan to listen for shots and to question our truck drivers. After 45 years, we have finally remembered to remove from our "SIP [Secretariat for Foreign Affairs]" diplomacy that waxen expression of worthless protocols, ambassador's credentials, and counterfeit bilateralism.

An anecdote, still fresh at the time, which awaited me four years ago at the beginning of my 10-day visit to Albania revealed from the very first day the utter futility of the pursuit of diplomacy in that country. It concerned Franz Jozef Strauss, the president of Bavaria, that "terrible" author of the West German postwar economic miracle, who had visited Tirana ahead of me. Led on by his crafty businessman's and tradesman's nose, drawn on by the trifling prices of ore and raw materials, he set up the details of his arrival in Tirana, but at the last moment he caused a great surprise by refusing to travel by plane and ordered an ordinary jeep to meet him at the border.

In that open jeep, he probably traveled over the same road to Tirana as I did and saw everything that I myself saw. First, he saw that nonsensical railroad just finished that connects Albania for the first time with one and only one foreign country (Yugoslavia). Since he had to cross that railroad at two or three places, he probably looked in amazement at the places where the rails were hanging in the air, since the roadbed, built up with crushed stone instead of gravel, had already melted away, and the rails had twisted.

He must also have seen those gloomy villages and fields which looked as though a fire had raged through them the day before, and then those thousands of ridiculous small hemispherical bunkers, which look like the white caps worn by Shqipetars had flown from men's heads and scattered along the road with black loopholes turned toward Yugoslavia.

Finally, he also saw something that derailed him completely: Instead of trucks and passenger cars, aside from him on the dual highway there was the clip-clopping of the hooves of horses hitched to carts carrying freight and people and everything that has to be carried. Hundreds of such horse carts accompanied us along the way and encountered us in the streets of Tirana.

And the first thing he did when he sat down to the negotiating table was to ask for an explanation of those caravans of horse carts. First, they asked him if perhaps he had noticed the wooden cab, as a humanistic note, in which the driver sits protected from the wind and rain? Just as though he were sitting in some truck, except that instead of the windshield he has a slit for his eyes, and instead of a steering wheel he holds the reins, that run through two slits. Then they informed him not that they have not imported a single truck or bus since the break

with China, their last ally, but that the decision at the last party congress to make the transition to horse power is a wonderful change of direction, since one of the side effects is that it increases the livestock population 100 times over, develops horse raising and the sausage industry. "Which means that this has been the progress of your Marxist-Leninist party in this ideological change of direction: Instead of going forward, you are going back 100 years," Strauss said briefly, stood up and rushed to the airport, where he took the first airplane to Germany so as not to waste any time.

Fear of the Mother Tongue

But it seems that Strauss' "undiplomatic" eye did not need even that much. He was not even interested in man's right to freedom and a decent life, but favorable terms for cheap raw materials. It took him only a few hours to see and openly report what the polite diplomatic "waiters" have been postponing for years. His subsequent statement that Albania as a country is a mockery, and that the people who have put up with this for years is also a mockery, still does not fit into the vocabulary of a newsman who has committed himself once and for all to understanding and sympathy for every people. It is precisely that kind of some "decency of ours" that perhaps kept me from mentioning when I returned from Albania two or three sketches about our minorities in Albania, which I will not skip over on this occasion, especially since last night's TV broadcast of Silvija Luks' interview with Claude Cheysson, deputy to the European Parliament, and Mitterand's minister, and her hysterical and panting joy at abundantly adding to his doubt about the correctness of what is happening in Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, with human rights and freedoms.

First of all, about that boy on the highway to Tirana at dusk who hitched a ride with a car from our embassy. When the ambassador opened the door for him and hospitably offered him a ride, asking "Do you want to go with us to Tirana," the boy answered him rudely in Serbo-Croatian, "Are you crazy, I would not set my foot in your car, don't you know that you are from Yugoslavia?" He also managed to say that he was a Montenegrin, and then he turned and began to run across the field like someone running from rifle fire, until finally he became a tiny dot on the horizon. He ran so that no one would see him, he was saving his little life.

The second case occurred when we spoke our language to a waiter in Vlore. With a police permit in hand allowing us to go to Vlore, we somehow got rid of our Sigurimi escorts, to whom we waved while they were lying on the road for the umpteenth time repairing their worn-out car, and along the way we turned off to the "Albanian Parthenon," the Hellenistic archeological ruins of Apollonion. It had not been 40 minutes before the Mercedes and the Tirana chief of police had parked behind us.

The question was who told him we were here?

While we were looking at the remains of the temple and the ancient amphitheater, they pulled a chaise longue

from the car for him, set it up in the grass with a folding table and served him lunch. While he was snacking, those with him punctured two of our tires.

They did not know that we would have two spares and that we would be able to continue our trip to Vlore. Can this be how the chief of police of Albania's capital spends his time: first issuing you a permit to travel, and then puncturing your tires! When we finally entered an empty restaurant without an escort and began to "hunt and peck" some Italian to order wine and coffee, the waiter's face lit up, and he shouted: "Brother Serb, speak freely, I am one of yours...." He never finished the next sentence. "Those two men" from the car stopped on the road entered by the door behind his back. I never saw a man shake like that waiter, whom horror and fear so altered and disfigured that even today I cannot remember what he looked like at first. I only know that he was walking like a zombie and had already taken off his waiter's coat, and he disappeared between the two of them, never to return.

If Claude Cheysson Knew That

Could it be only because he tried to speak his native language, the language of his own nationality? I remember that in Gostivar, Pec, or Pristina no one in the stores wanted to wait on me and speak to me otherwise than in Albanian, which I do not understand. They won't do it in your country, and here they do not allow Serbo-Croatian. Is that something that Claude Cheysson knew last night while he was listening to his interviewer so sleekly and with such appetite read him the figure on the "horrible percentage" of only 37 percent of human rights and freedoms realized in Yugoslavia (thinking above all of Kosovo and Vilasi)?

Do they know, for example, how little Saska Blazevska, the daughter of a civil servant in our embassy in Tirana, came home from kindergarten with her head bowed and told her mother: "Mama, if my friend Gigi plays with me, her people, the Albanians, will take her off to prison."

I recalled our own Albanian children in Pec standing in front of the gate of a Serbian architect in Pec who is an acquaintance of mine and waiting for his wife to set out to the market. And then that pack of some 20 little kids threw stones at her from full pockets all the way through the town and back, chanting "Gabeljka, Gabeljka..." (Gypsy, Gypsy...), and their mothers would reward them with kisses. And so every other day that woman walked through the town in the biblical role of the martyr Stevan, until they were driven to sell the family home and move away without a trace.

Do you remember on Pristina television that Albanian from Pec, wearing a neat and clean blue worker's coveralls, since immediately on returning from Albania, where he first had fled, had been rewarded with a job in a gas station; do you remember what he said: "No, neither the shovel, nor the forced labor, nor the prison—what was

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hardest for me there in Albania was that they made fun of me and added an 'ich' to my last name, which is Albanian."

He said that on a television program in a country in which there are at least 10 million people whose last name ends in "ich."

What can our embassy and our diplomats in Tirana really do? In every regular official conversation with Albanian officials, just as they have been doing for years, to demand three initial things: clear statistical figures on the number of Macedonians, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Croats; the same rights for them as for Albanians in Yugoslavia; and repayment of the debt of \$100 million. For years, neither the first, nor the second, nor the third has turned a hair on the head of Enver Hoxha's successors.

Mr. Claude Cheysson need not know that, since he comes from a democratic country whose intellectuals last year rooted feverishly for the Nobel Prize to go to a confirmed adherent of a realism that is already worn-out, Hoxha's pet, the writer Ismail Kadare, for books in which he glorifies that small country of silence, since the moans from the solitary prison cell do not reach them. When 60 of them die of hunger and cold, since they cannot make it to the cooperative bakery through the snowdrifts in the mountains, and they can get their ration on only one day, then the report says that they were buried in an ice slide, and the small country of Albania sinks into its disciplined silence.

Nor does even Silvija Luks have to know about that. In her republic, 700,000 Serbs "intentionally" speak Serbian, and "intentionally" wear their own native costumes in order to "intentionally" go to prison as soon as possible.

Perhaps we feel that if our minorities in Albania lived just like the Albanians themselves, that that is enough punishment for them and that there is no need for intervention here. And if they live still worse, then they live like those 400,000 Greeks, and since the Greeks in Athens are already up in arms because of their brothers, perhaps this will incidentally get something done for our minorities as well. And perhaps they have a hard time of it there in Albania only in the daytime. After all, daytime there is as dark as night, and nighttime there is like a relief: Everything is dissolved into the symphony of crickets, into the clattering of the horse-drawn carts, into those regular syncopes that rock that small lethargic country to and fro and take it backward, backward, infinitely backward.... No one knows how far.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

CDU's Stolpe Interviewed on Political Changes

90GE0006A Potsdam MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME in German 13 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Consistorial President Dr. H.C. Manfred Stolpe (Protestant Church) by Horst Sperfeld; place and

date not given: "Mediation Activities as a Profession and a Calling—Use the Pending Election to Strengthen the Young Democracy"—first paragraph is MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME [MV] introduction]

[Text] It is not just since the days of October and November of the year just past that the name Dr. Manfred Stolpe has been repeatedly appearing in the news in the GDR and the Federal Republic. Before the revolutionary events of last fall, the consistorial president appeared in the general public whenever it was important to mediate between the authorities of the old GDR state and party leadership and the opposition forces seeking refuge in the Church. In the recent weeks and months, the educated lawyer has often been the starting point and organizer for meetings with the government and state council of the GDR with political and spiritual representatives, especially from western countries. The meeting between GDR prime minister Hans Modrow and the West German President Richard von Weizsaecker here in Potsdam, both of whom were invited by Dr. Stolpe, is still well remembered. All these activities led the MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME editors to invite the Church representative sitting in Potsdam to an interview.

MV: Dr. Stolpe, please first explain the term consistorial president and its field of responsibility.

Dr. Stolpe: The designation consistorial president developed historically. The "consistorium" is the traditional name of the Church administration. The term is as old as the Protestant Church, that is, centuries old. It also appears in other churches, such as the Roman Church, for example. The additional word "president" describes the leadership role in this administration. Whereas other similar functions are called general secretary, the content of the position is as executive director of the Church leadership. At the same time, I am the senior staff attorney of the Church administration and so also responsible for external legal representation. Just in the recent years and decades, I have been especially called on to represent the rights of the Church vis-a-vis the state.

MV: To simplify that, could you be described as the interior and foreign minister of the Church?

Dr. Stolpe: That is definitely too general. There are certainly moments, though, when that is true because foreign representation and domestic Church representation do play a role in it. The Bishop has the deciding mandate in all these questions.

MV: How does a man as a young attorney come straight to the Church?

Dr. Stolpe: That has to do with personal things, with familiar ties and individual relationship to the Christian faith. Exactly 30 years ago, when I had my diploma in my pocket, the Church was just seeking people trained in GDR legal questions, and I carried that in my briefcase.

MV: You are not a member of any political party. Why not? It is certainly conceivable that you would feel at home in the CDU [Christian Democratic Union].

Dr. Stolpe: I am not a member of any party and also do not intend to tie myself to a party, although the multitude of possibilities has certainly grown. For my activities, it has been better and will be better in the future to cultivate contacts with many parties and groups, both foreign and domestic. Party affiliation would not necessarily be helpful for that. Naturally, I have had and I now have contacts with the CDU here in the GDR.

MV: In the past years, the Church has often been forced into a role it did not care for too much. How does the Church see its mission before and after the so-called change?

Dr. Stolpe: The Church must take care of the concerns of its patrons, according to its own understanding, at all times and in all conceivable social orders. Among other things, that actually means it must contribute to peaceful coexistence of people. We understand the mission that Jesus Christ gave his disciples here and now thus, that he demands love of neighbor and forgiveness in real society. That can also appear that, where other forces take a strong stand for peace and justice, the Church as an institution does not necessarily need to adopt this task itself. However, where for example certain forces hold themselves back or conscientiously avoid a few rocky points in conjunction with justice of communal life, as was the case here in the GDR in the years behind us, we feel called to action.

We could not pull ourselves out in the past, when people found themselves among us in the expectation that we would accept this point. Therefore, we have adopted a substitute function, even though we are also of the opinion that political activities must be undertaken by political organization forms. Only in exceptional cases, which in looking back appears to have been often, should the Church do something like that.

We currently see two fields in which we feel called. One is being effective against force and the danger of use of force. The other is the mediation between talks, that is, the stimulation of comprehensive social dialogue for the common shaping of the future. The impetus towards the Roundtable originated from this concept.

MV: Back to the man Manfred Stolpe. Here in Potsdam or in Berlin where your official office is, off and on, you received important personalities from various directions, both in the geographical and political sense. Dr. Manfred Stolpe had meetings with the old and the new GDR top. From that, it has arisen, among other things, that this Mr. Stolpe had respect, but was equally highly respected. What could be added onto that?

Dr. Stolpe: That is the situation of an intermediary. I must live with that in my function. When working with so many different people as is necessary, it is not always possible to do right by all. In my function, I have the task

of establishing contacts between completely different people, across borders, too. In addition, out of personal conviction of faith, I have striven to assist people of various viewpoints to come to discussion, and so reach an understanding. I feel particularly obliged here in the European sphere in questions of detente, in conjunction with the Helsinki process. The binding of contacts naturally helps to relax the situation.

On the domestic side, my desire is to hold opposing positions in discussions, because I am convinced that discussions with one another prevent force. When people know too little about one another, the danger is very great that aggression builds up, pictures of an enemy become entrenched, and everything revolves around the use of force.

MV: What role did the Church play in the past weeks of the revolution here at home?

Dr. Stolpe: I believe that the Church has been helpful in two ways. For one, as much as they attempted to influence the masses and closely maintained their avoidance of the use of force. The other was the unending great effort on various levels undertaken to likewise advise the political authorities against the use of force. Ultimately, it did not suffice for the masses to remain peaceful, but the holders of power must also be won over to that side. Look at Romania as a negative example. The masses were initially peaceful there, too. In the GDR, too, not only was the potential for force there, but (that force) could have been used without any further required actions.

MV: We discussed the encounters which you organized. A purely technical question regarding that: How did the Modrow-Weizsaecker meeting come about?

Dr. Stolpe: Naturally, that only happens when you know people like them for a long time. So, no great effort was required to inquire about interest [in such a meeting]. The actual invitation was only then an external formality. There was interest here on both sides, and it was apparently also a time which both sides saw as very important.

MV: In the meantime, people here talk about an election on 6 May. What does the Church see as its mission in that regard? Does it even have one?

Dr. Stolpe: We will certainly not do one thing, namely, take a position for or against one of the parties or groups. We base that on the fact Christians could become involved in quite varied party leadership, certainly even in the realm of the SED-PDS [Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism]. The one-track view of the world is no longer so rigidly ordained over there. We will give support to the holding of a fair campaign, a humanly dignified campaign so that personal attacks do not burden this contest. We will urge the citizens to also use this first election because they would contribute to the strengthening of the newly won democracy. For us, it is almost secondary for whom the

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individual casts his vote. It is first of all important that he takes hold of the opportunity to participate in forming the democracy.

MV: We always want to come back to the person of Dr. h.c. Manfred Stolpe. There are voices from various directions, above all from the Democratic Awakening party (DA), who bring up your name when it comes to the occupation of high state functions, even up to a possible President of our republic. Where do you stand on that?

Dr. Stolpe: Yes, I have been discussed several times since November. However, that was at the same time with the opinions of others who found negative things in me. For example, I was also named as an opponent candidate to Hans Modrow from a certain new direction. People want to talk me into various ministerial offices, and so on. I can only respond to all of that by saying that I have never sought such offices and never have been consulted in the past about such considerations. That can be explained by my intermediary activities, by my being so conspicuous in these activities over the past years, and also by corresponding criticism of my person, as for example at the beginning of 1989 by ADN [General German News Service]. Also, there are not very many recognizable political faces, so those kinds of people are being sought out and, in my case, apparently found. I am not out for such an office. I believe much more strongly that the Church as a stabilizing factor may be further sought, and so I will have enough tasks to do on my own territory. On the other side, I see that the Church has a certain advantage in the area of democracy, and that the forces which come from that must become active in politics. That should mean that when a man is needed, even a representative of the Church should not avoid such a task.

MV: Allow me to cut back. You do not mean that precisely because of the past obviously successful intermediary activities of the Church that the search for a possible state president as a father figure, as a man above these things, will be sought just in this field?

Dr. Stolpe: I do not know what motives did or do play a role there: First of all, no such function exists in our constitution. On the other hand, I do lean towards the position that in a collective body such as the state council there is also a good potential for smoothing out the various positions. Still, the state council has 24 members which offers the possibility of exchange of all the positions at a table.

MV: What is your opinion when you so clearly hear the call for reunification from the masses?

Dr. Stolpe: First I think of the cause. Since 9 November, millions of GDR citizens have had a double experience which strikes quite deeply. One is that younger people are discovering that German people also live behind the border. In fact, they were already aware of that, but the experience itself is something completely different. The second is the great injustice of the economic decline. They now ask the reason why and what the possible

solutions are. In connecting the national with the economic problems, the notion arises very quickly that annexation of the GDR by the Federal Republic would sweep the problems off the table. And the phrase reunification comes up so quickly. It was used more than a little in irresponsible statements by West German politicians in the interests of their own election campaigns. To this day, though, they are avoiding the problems which stand before them.

MV: What would those problems be?

Dr. Stolpe: Well, the fact that there is still no peace treaty, that all questions dealing with Germany as a whole would have to be decided by the four allied powers, that decisions on border questions must be made, although formal securing of those borders is missing and that both sovereign German states play an important role in the Helsinki process. It is a dark and, yes, misleading term when reunification is spoken of. The term must be realistically translated and explained. It does not make any sense to prohibit it. In this national problem, there is also quite an explosive power in the total European sphere. However, I do not see this discussion as just a source of irritation across our borders, but also affecting our process of democratization. An honest discussion is therefore urgently needed with the citizens on this story.

MV: Do you foresee this growing together in the future?

Dr. Stolpe: The fact of one nation exists. Herbert Wehner once said, "Blood is thicker than water." I believe, though, that a fixation on a one-state control is short-sighted. That would then signify carrying the Wall to the Oder River, that is, the social gap would be moved to the East. That would be an uncoupling from Eastern Europe and so strongly un-European, in my view. Other and certainly original paths of solution must be found.

MV: Given that, how should the GDR look in your opinion? How will the GDR as a state become functional again?

Dr. Stolpe: Our problem is that we begin from the point that we must rethink the role of the state as an institution of power. It appears to me that a copy of an available model is not possible. The development process, the time for hashing out problems would come up too short. That would be a mistake. I also do not believe that it will be so. I draw from the many arguments that there are many clever people who would be in position to develop a completely new relationship between the citizen and the state. A functioning state force is naturally a part of a functioning community body. A force responsible for order and security is extremely important.

MV: You could, therefore, imagine an alternative way vis-a-vis the Federal Republic, for example, even with the currently visible dependency in economic questions?

Dr. Stolpe: I am convinced that we will retain alternative elements which we already possess. The GDR society, for example, is a unified society in which the individual

stands much closer next to another with much fewer social differences than in the Federal Republic. I occasionally hear that the GDR is a country of small people, which I do not take at all as a slander. For me, that is an expression of the closeness of people to one another. From that comes more direct forms of interrelationship.

MV: One form is the Roundtable. Does it not presume off and on too many competency?

Dr. Stolpe: The Roundtable brings a substantially broader range of positions into discussion than there currently is in the People's Chamber. There are standpoints which do not arise in the work of the government. At least up until the democratic elections, the round table is for me an acceptable, a revolutionary form of participation. I consider it sensible and appropriate that the People's Chamber and government are involved, that they accept and influence which is actually legally quite impossible. However, the danger lies in the fact that the Roundtable could miss things just as the People's Chamber currently does—it does not come close to representing all citizens. I suspect, for example, that almost half of the GDR populace does not recognize itself belonging to one of the established parties or the new parties or groups.

MV: You don't see a lack of technical competence in the people at the Roundtable?

Dr. Stolpe: No, no way. I consider the level of activity at the Roundtable to be surprisingly high, based on my past observations. It appears to be to be a completely good form of transition until the legitimate exercise of power after the elections of 6 May.

MV: A little shift in thought here. Is the Army still appropriate at this time?

Dr. Stolpe: The value of the Army must be judged in the international sphere. I am quite happy that our military leadership also sees it that way, and not as an internal political instrument. That is the beginning. The value comes from the condition of negotiations on security and cooperation in Europe, from the condition of disarmament negotiations. A unilateral dissolution of the Army would considerably disturb this international process. Perhaps you are surprised by this type of argument coming from me, a Church representative, but I can only see that in the total-European context. The GDR Army and its preparedness to disarm is an important factor in the Stockholm and Vienna negotiations.

MV: Is communism obsolete?

Dr. Stolpe: We should stop haunting ourselves with crazy terms. If so, then we must redefine it. The basic tenets of communism, justice, freedom, and so on will always return. They are thousands of years old and are found, not last, in almost all religions. As long as there are social differences between people, corresponding goals will always arise. That will not go under. Here and now, we are dealing with the sinking of one variety which

proved to have massive structural mistakes. The old dream of man will remain and certainly even arise again.

MV: What do we need here at home the most?

Dr. Stolpe: A great treasure of ideas and experience which protect justice, peace and all creation. A meeting over viewpoints and borders is also necessary for that. The expression of a survival community of people characterizes that for me clearly and does not just refer to the little GDR but to all the parts of our world.

[Box, p 3]

About the man: Consistorial President Dr. h.c. Manfred Stolpe is an attorney and three times that. He is educated in the fields of GDR law, Federal Republic law, and Church law. He did not simply begin service in the Protestant Church 30 years ago by accident, but by his own effort. His personal views on the Christian faith developed from familiar ties and experience of his youth make their mark here. He is not a member of any political party. He was given the honorary promotion in 1988 from the Department of Theology of the University of Greifswald for his outstanding efforts towards giving the Protestant Church a higher profile in the GDR, efforts on behalf of the individual and for the observation of human rights, and for a clear organizational structure within the Church. Dr. Stolpe lives in Potsdam, is married to a doctor, and has a daughter currently studying legal sciences in Berlin.

HUNGARY

Elections: Final, Corrected List of Candidates

25000684A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
8 Mar 90 pp 13-16

[Unattributed article: "Candidates in Individual Voting Districts"]

[Text]

Key to Parties

FIDESZ	Association of Young Democrats
FKgP	Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Citizens Party
HVK	Patriotic Election Coalition
KDNP	Christian Democratic People's Party
MDF	Hungarian Democratic Forum
MNP	Hungarian Peoples Party
MSZMP	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party
MSZP	Hungarian Socialist Party
MSZDP	Social Democratic Party of Hungary
SZDSZ	Alliance of Free Democrats
IND	Independent Candidates
MISC	Miscellaneous Parties

POLITICAL

Key to Miscellaneous Parties		(9)	People of the East
(1)	Entrepreneurs' Party	(10)	Association of the Defenders of Nature and of Society
(2)	Hungarian Independence Party	(11)	Party of Generations, Pensioners, and Families
(3)	National Smallholders and Citizens Party	(12)	Hungarian Cooperative and Agricultural Party
(4)	Independent Social Democratic Party	(13)	Independent Hungarian Democratic Party
(5)	Alliance for the Villages and the Countryside Election Party	(14)	Social Democratic Party of Hungarian Gypsies
(6)	Agrarian Alliance	(15)	Freedom Party
(7)	"FEDISZ-Kiskunfelegyhaza, TEDISZ-Kiskunmajsa"	(16)	Somogy Christian Coalition
(8)	Hungarian Green Party	(17)	Sacred Crown Society
		(18)	Party for a Hungarian Countryside

Budapest [Part I]

Voting District	Budapest District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1	I-II	Klara Ungar	Istvan Haefller	—	Zsolt Semjen	Gyorgy Banffy	—
2	II	Gergely Benedeguz Cseh	Istvan Morvay	—	Dr. Gyorgy Rubovszky	Attila Zsigmond	—
3	III	Istvan Hegedus	Dr. Balazs Dolhay	Mrs. Laszlo Kovacs	Dr. Tivadar Lohner	Csaba Siklos	—
4	III	—	—	—	—	Laszlo Sarossy	—
5	IV	Mihaly Szechenyi	Sandor Gyulai	Mrs. Lajos Bozso	—	Gyula Fekete Jr.	—
6	IV-XV	—	Ferenc Naszadi	Dr. Istvan Pal-falvi	Gyorgy Pinter	Istvan Inczeff	—
7	V-XIII	—	—	Dr. Bela Szalma; Dr. Pal Gagyor	Dr. Nandor Rott	Dr. Gyorgy Schamschula	—
8	VI	Peter Molnar	Dr. Rudolf Deme	—	—	Kalman Katona	—
9	VII	Gyorgy Kerenyi	Geza Mikolay	—	Dr. Miklos Gaspar	Csaba Erhardt	—
10	VII-VIII	Zoltan Rockenbauer	Peter Szabo	Dr. Tamas Fekete	—	Dr. Tamas Somogyi	—
11	VIII	Gergely Barath	—	Dr. Jozsef Sebes	—	Laszlo Maroti	Mrs. Szirtes, Erika Tomtsits
12	IX	Tamas Tirts	Dr. Ferenc Dekany	Dr. Frigyes Tallosy	Miklos Furedi	Dr. Ivan Szabo	—
13	IX-XX	Viktor Orban	—	—	Gabor Csordas	Dr. Gyula Zacsék	Laszlo Boros; Tamas Szalay
14	X	Zsuzsa Hartyanyi	—	—	—	Laszlo Dobos	—
15	XI	Gabor Fodor	—	Dr. Peter Biacs	Dr. Laszlo Grigassy	Dr. Miklos Csapodi	—
16	XI	Tamas Deutsch	Janos Kis	—	Andras Bato	Dr. Gabor Perjes	Andras Salamin
17	XI	Szilard Sasvari	—	—	—	Dr. Zoltan Katai	—
18	XII	Gabor Stiedt	Dr. Gyorgy Balogh	—	Dr. Laszlo Surjan	Bela Horvath	—
19	XIII	Zoltan Csatari	—	—	Miklos Budavari	Attila Csaji	—
20	XIII	—	Dr. Sandor Gyorivanyi	Mrs. Jozsef Czinkoczky	—	Kata Beke	Ferenc Gal

Budapest [Part I] (Continued)

Voting District	Budapest District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
21	XIV	Lajos Gyori-Molnar	Dr. Miklos Zsak	—	—	Dr. Laszlo Arva	Bela Bazso
22	XIV	Laszlo Akos Nemeth	—	Mrs. Jozsef Varga	Peter Harrach	Imre Csepella	Dr. Ferenc Martini
23	XV	Zoltan Bogdany	Pal Dragon	—	—	Dr. Laszlo Hornok	Dr. Istvan Geczi
24	XVI	Dr. Janos Ader	—	Zoltan Dome	Istvan Simon	Janos Palotas	—
25	XVII	Imre Frajna	—	Dr. Istvan Kal-noki Gyongy-ossy	Dr. Gyorgy Nemesszeghy	Dr. Gabor Balla	Andras Varga
26	X-XVIII	Tamas Tercsak	—	—	Gyula Sonnevend	Janos Denes	—
27	XVIII	Dr. Gabor Tamas Nagy	Marton Medveczky	—	Mrs. Dr. Zoltan Farkas	Dr. Zoltan Szeleczky	Mrs. Haselbauer, Maria Zs. Molnar
28	XIX	—	Mrs. Kiss, Edit Kiraly	Jozsef Heftet	Dr. Bela Szabo	Dr. Andras Attila Fodor	—
29	XX	—	—	Dr. Miklos Fulop	Janos Unyi Jr.	Dr. Bela Vizy	Dr. Jeno Buncsak; Dr. Gusztav Gyulai; Jeno Perlaki
30	XXI	Laszlo Kaman	—	Dr. Dezso Bolla	—	Dr. Janos Gyurko	—
31	XXI	—	—	—	—	Geza Homoki	Dr. Lajos Molnar
32	XXII	Zsolt Nemeth	—	Dr. Tibor Toth	Mrs. Szepesfalvi, Marta Magassy	Peter Meszaros	—

Budapest [Part II]

Voting District	Budapest District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1	I-II	Dr. Istvan Kis-zely	Laszlo Udvar-helyi	Ivan Vitanyi	—	Dr. Alajos Dornbach	—
2	II	—	Attila Moravcsik	Gyula Bubla	—	Dr. Matyas Eorsi	—
3	III	Laszlo Sebestyen	Attila Regoczi	Dr. Sandor Orosz	—	Dr Bela Levay	—
4	III	—	Gyula Kovacs	Dr. Laszlo Kelen	Gyorgy Szecsi	Gabor Ivanyi	—
5	IV	—	Zoltan Kerekes	Gabor Csizmar	—	Dr. Istvan Meszaros	Gabor Bartos (1); Tibor Hornyak (2)
6	IV-XV	—	Elemer Csaba	Ambrus Szantai Sarkozy	Dr. Endre Borbely Jr.	Dr. Ferenc Torok	—
7	V-XIII	—	Dr. Peter Bognar	Laszlo Matyas Szabo	—	Miklos Tamas Gaspar	—
8	VI	Dr. Ferenc Pecze	Dr. Janos Kalman	Laszlo Pal	Dr. Anna Petrasovits	Jozsef Szekhelyi	—
9	VII	—	Mrs. Dr. Jozsef Aggod	Pal Fillo	Dr. Gyorgy Hahn	Dr. Gabor Demszky	—
10	VII-VIII	—	—	Dr. Zoltan Szabo	—	Tamas Raj	—

POLITICAL

Budapest [Part II] (Continued)

Voting District	Budapest Dis-trict	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
11	VIII	—	—	Mrs. Kosa, Dr. Magda Kovacs	Janos Boucskey	Miklos Haraszti	—
12	IX	—	—	Sandor Fekete	—	Dr. Peter Tolgyessy	—
13	IX-XX	—	Andras Szechy	Laszlo Robert	—	Miklos Szabo	—
14	X	—	Pal Baranyai	Dr. Tamas Egri	Dr. Lidia Hars	Antal Horvat	—
15	XI	—	Gabor Benyovszky	Gyorgy Markos	—	Dr. Peter Hack	—
16	XI	—	Tamas Hir-schler	Karoly Hellner	Dr. Janos Grad	Ferenc Koszeg	—
17	XI	—	—	Ildiko Monos-tori	—	Tamas Bauer	—
18	XII	—	Dr. Laszlo Erdei	Dr. Bela Fabry	—	Mihaly Raday	—
19	XIII	—	Karoly Kovacs	Dr. Istvan Kiss	—	Ivan Darvas	—
20	XIII	Dr. Tibor Nemeth	Pal Kollat	Gyorgy Marosan Jr.	—	Laszlo Rajk	—
21	XIV	—	Sandor Dauda	Csaba Vass	Ivan Kaszas	Balint Magyar	—
22	XIV	—	Dr. Jozsef Hajdu	Magdolna Vanko	—	Ivan Peto	—
23	XV	—	Dr. Ferenc Szilard	Attila Siklosi	—	Imre Mecs	—
24	XVI	—	Pal Majdan	Mrs. Lestar, Maria Varga	—	Gabor Veg	Erno Tozser (1)
25	XVII	—	—	Mrs. Voros, Dr. Judit Ban	Dr. Gyorgy Ruttner	Istvan Szent-Ivanyi	—
26	X-XVIII	—	—	Dr. Bela Katona	Karoly Szoke	Zoltan Fedak	—
27	XVIII	—	—	Arpad Keny-eres	Istvan Angyan	Dr. Janos Somogyi	Jozsef Kun (1)
28	XIX	—	—	Istvan Fejes	Laszlo Berces	Istvan Kohalmi	Kalman Konkoly (3)
29	XX	—	—	Antal Reger	—	Marta Balogh	—
30	XXI	—	Gyula Nogradzi	Miklos Kisari	—	Dr. Tamas Szasz	Karoly Lorant (4)
31	XXI	—	—	Peter Csaba	—	Dr. Karoly Lotz	—
32	XXII	—	—	Dr. Gyorgy Koteles	Dezso Jaczko	Gabriella Beki	Janos Mihlay (3)

Baranya County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Pecs	—	Andras Galbats	Dr. Zoltan Igloi	—	Dr. Bertalan Andrasfalvy	—
2 Pecs	Zoltan Trombitas	Sandor Szeles	Mrs. Kaposi, Dr. Maria Dunai	—	Andras Pap	Sandor Gyulai; Jozsef Kuller; Dr. Istvan Marton
3 Pecs	Dr. Andrea Barth	Miklos Bogner	Dr. Bela Sipos	Janos Ursprung	Dr. Sandor Med-nyanszky	—
4 Komlo	Jozsef Levay	Istvan Timaffy	Gabor Huszka	Lajos Onozo	Dr. Jozsef Hoppa	Antal Bischof

Baranya County [Part I] (Continued)

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
5 Mohacs	—	Dr. Miklos Ferenc	Janos T. Kovacs	Antal Monostori	Dr. Ferenc Biro	GYula Gaspar; Janos Gyurok
6 Siklos	Dr. Peter Heindl	Dr. Ferenc Jozsef Nagy	Dr. Miklos Horvath	—	Janos Krebsz	Istvan Lazar
7 Szigetvar	—	Ferenc Szomor	Sandor Szeghy	—	Dr. Jozsef Kapronczay	Istvan Matis; Jozsef Paizs

Baranya Country [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Pecs	—	—	Janos Spolar	Mozes Kovacs	Dr. Levente Varga	—
2 Pecs	—	Ferenc Cseresnyes	Mrs. Molnar, Katalin Szili	Dr. Otto Angyal	Jozsef Getto	—
3 Pecs	—	—	Jozsef Vonyo	Zoltan Buczo	Zoltan Bretter	Dr. Jeno Gaspar (5)
4 Komlo	—	Istvan Prohaszka	Dr. Huba Kiss	Jozsef Szabo	Gedeon Fekete	Dr. Gyula Kobor (5); Elemer Szarka (6)
5 Mohacs	—	—	Laszlo Puch	Bela Kovesi	Jozsef Werner	Dr. Ferenc Wekler (5)
6 Siklos	—	Zoltan Varkoly	Margit Szujko	—	Dr. Peter Heindl	Dr. Ferenc Simor (6)
7 Szigetvar	Istvan Nemeth	Zoltan Kecskemeti Jr.	Dr. Matyas Fekete	—	Dr. Laszlo Molvay	Jozsef Fabi (5); Istvan Gerenday (3)

Bacs-Kiskun County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Kecskemet	Laszlo Hertelendy	Jozsef Kalmar	—	—	Dr. Fabian Jozsa	—
2 Kecskemet	Zsolt Sarkadi	Janos Szarapka	—	—	Dr. Jozsef Debreczeni	Arpad Velkei
3 Tiszakecske	Andras Racz	Andras Borcsok; Lajos Manyoki	Pal Martus; Sandor Varga	Zoltan Kovacs	Kanya Gabor	Dr. Geza Nagy
4 Kunszentmiklos	—	Jozsef Faddy	Bela Sitkei	—	Szabolcs Bodai	Dr. Laszlo Szucs
5 Kiskunfelegyhaza	—	Dr. Denes Hollo	Mrs. Dobos, Dr. Maria Patyi; Dr. Gyorgy Borotai	Illes Udvardy	Pal Fekete	—
6 Kiskoros	Gyorgy Opauszky	Dr. Istvan Pohankovics	Sandor Csipko	—	Endre Varga	Gyorgy Gyuris; Ferenc Morvai; Agoston Nagy; Sandor Racz
7 Kalocsa	Antal Perity	Andras Kosa	Dr. Ferenc Markus	—	Dr. Janos Barth	Laszlo Marko
8 Kiskunhalas	—	Dr. Laszlo Horvath	—	Bela Besesek	Dr. Sandor R. Kiss	—
9 Baja	—	Balint Dancsa	Dr. Istvan Vajtai; Dr. Antal Zorn	—	Dr. Tamas Peterfi	Laszlo Sarossy
10 Bacsalmas	—	Dr. Bela Franek	Istvan Kiss	—	Peter Karsai	Dr. Bertalan Sudi

Bacs-Kiskun County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Kecskemet	Klara Kovacs	—	Attila Nagy	Bela Toth	Dr. Laszlo Sandor	Janos Wolf (1)
2 Kecskemet	—	—	Laszlo Bruszel	—	Tamas Toth	—
3 Tiszakecske	—	Jozsef Eros	Sandor Varga	—	Dr. Ferenc Friegyessy	Balazs Szarka (6)
4 Kunszentmiklos	—	Miklos Czerna	Janos Aranyi	—	Janos Sarro	Dr. Istvan Bak (6); Andras Baski (1)
5 Kiskunfelegyhaza	—	—	—	—	Dr. Laszlo Reczi	Dr. Istvan Garai (7); Jeno Seres (1)
6 Kiskoros	—	—	Mrs. Ferenc Moravcsik	—	Dr. Bela Szenohradzski	—
7 Kalocsa	Geza Szekelyhidy	—	Janos Gonda	Laszlo Szarvas	Dr. Geza Andriska	Tibor Lajtos (2); Tivadar Lakatos (1)
8 Kiskunhalas	Dr. Laszlo Farkas	Karoly Kollar	Gyorgy Kiraly	Jozsef F. Nagy	Zoltan Toth	Dr. Gyula Bar (1); Mrs. Istvan Toth (6)
9 Baja	—	Dr. Laszlo Fekete	Miklos Varhalmi	Ferenc Papp	Andras Nagy	Dr. Laszlo Gergely (1)
10 Bacsalmas	Dr. Attila Szoboszlai	—	Dr. Imre Szahl	Jakab Ujvari	Dr. Peter Sztancsics	Imre Czibolya (1)

Bekes County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Bekescsaba	Attila Petho	Dr. Geza Zsiros	Pal Kutyej	—	Zoltan Szokolay	—
2 Gyula	Karoly Durko	Ferenc Tar	—	—	Dr. Andras Liptak	Gyorgy Hild
3 Bekes	—	Dr. Gyula Pasztor	—	—	Istvan Csurka	Dr. Istvan Farkas
4 Szeghalom	—	Istvan Kazinczy	Dr. Lajos Nyeki	—	Balint Lada	Dr. Laszlo Marothy; Tibor Molnar
5 Szarvas	—	Lajos Hunya	—	—	—	Zoltan Deme; Janos Fekete; Dr. Judit Kolbusz; Janos Szembegynszki
6 Oroshaza	—	Tibor Domokos	—	—	Zoltan Varga	—
7 Mezokovacs-haza	Zoltan Fulop	Istvan Bakos	Bertalan Suli	—	Dr. Katalin Report	Dr. Bela Hajdara; Mrs. Jozsef Kovacs

Bekes County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Bekescsaba	Dr. Kond Ferdinand	Janos Kendra	Dr. Imre Simon	—	Dr. Zoltan Denes	Gyorgy Bohus (6); Laszlo Boross (8)
2 Gyula	Gyorgy Rokszin	Peter Hotya	Dr. Zoltan Arpasi	—	Peter Kadar	Imre Vigh (6)
3 Bekes	—	Gyorgy Morocz	Dr. Bela Janky	—	Sandor Sos	Laszlo Balogh (6); Zsigmond Rethy (8)

Bekes County [Part II] (Continued)

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
4 Szeghalom	—	Karoly Kiss	Mihaly Lehoczky	Gabor Santa	Dr. Boleslav Pelcsinszky	Sandor Agoston (4); Ildiko Doma (8); Sandor Szollosi (6)
5 Szarvas	Dr. Vince Hanyecz	—	Peter Kovacs	Imre Keri	—	—
6 Oroshaza	Dr. Vince Hanyecz	Antal Zalai	Imre Olajos	—	Sandor Toth	Andras Suranyi (6)
7 Mezokovacs-haza	—	Frigyes Puja	Pal Vastagh	Pal Farkas	Dr. Zsolt Hevesi	Dr. Janos Eleki (6)

Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Miskolc	—	Zsolt Rajkai	Dr. Csaba Csorba	Pal Kozak	Tibor Balazsi	—
2 Miskolc	Robert Repassy	Gyula Gonda	Dr. Gabor Papp	Dr. Tamas Isepy	Dr. Istvan Balas	Dr. Jozsef Toth
3 Miskolc	—	Tamas Barkoczy	Gabor Cservenyak	Jozsef Pikuvics	Lajos Mile	—
4 Miskolc	Tamas Wachsler	Dr. Geza Ivan	Dr. Istvan Barkoczy	Dr. Bertalan Horzsa	Dr. Gyorgy Kiss	Dr. Zoltan Lupkovich
5 Ozd	Dr. Miklos Meszaros	Balazs Bardos	Mrs. Gyula Filep	Sandor Feczko	Istvan Kis Sunyi	Dr. Laszlo Kormos; Ferenc Kovacs; Janos Petrenko
6 Sajoszentpeter	—	Istvan Maczo	Tamas Szendrei	Gyorgy Szarka	Arpad Miklos	Janos Fucsko; Ferenc Rabi; Dr. Ilona Szeman
7 Kazincbarcika	—	Zsigmond Deme	Dr. Arpad Balla	Jeno Ivanffy	Istvan Toth	Mrs. Egerszegi; Dr. Erzsebet Hurtag; Dr. Sandor Horvath; Sandor Kardos
8 Edeleny	—	Dr. Zoltan Szarka; Miklos Komjati	Imre Slezsak	—	Dr. Jozsef Domokos	Lajos Bartok; Lajos Nagy
9 Encs	—	Dr. Gyula Kiss	—	Andras Toth	Mrs. Nagy, Dr. Agnes Maczo	Mrs. Banszky, Eva Szepesi, Karoly Matisz
10 Satoraljaujhely	—	—	Gabor Koncz	Miklos Rusznak	Dr. Jozsef Nagy Bozsoki	Dr. Laszlo Kotelles; Dr. Miklos Muha
11 Szerencs	—	Laszlo Pelsoczy	—	Janos Puskas	Dr. Albert Toth	Miklos Nemeth
12 Leninvaros	—	Gyula Fedor	Bela Galba	Mrs. Peterfi, Ildiko Laszlo	Imre Laszlo Toth	Dezso Major; Dr. Antal Racz
13 Mezokovesd	—	Dr. Gyula Dobos	Dr. Laszlo Horvath	Antal Jaro	Ferenc Pesti	Gyula Molnar

Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Miskolc	—	—	Pal Toth	—	Bela Latran	Dr. Gyula Forster (8); Dr. Jozsef Kis (6)
2 Miskolc	—	Dr. Lorant Lorincz	Sandor Tompa	—	Dr. Laszlo Matyi	Dr. Ivan Gyulai (8)

Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen County [Part II] (Continued)

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
3 Miskolc	—	—	Katalin Korinthus	Laszlo Vagh	Eva Timar	Attila Bujdos (8); Dr. Attila Farkas (6); Andras Truskovszky (1)
4 Miskolc	—	Sandor Nyiro	Andras Rondzik	—	Dr. Pal Bodo	Lajos Farago (8)
5 Ozd	—	Janos Csizmar	Jozsef Ronto	Dr. Gyula Kasza	Csaba Koos	Dr. Tamas Nemeth (1); Dr. Laszlo Rests (6)
6 Sajoszentpeter	Dr. Andras Juhasz	Laszlo Hornyik	Dr. Andras Peter	—	Istvan Samu	Jozsef Pal (6)
7 Kazincbarcika	—	Tibor Orjovics	Dr. Balint Kiraly	Istvan Gasko	Piroska Csorba	Dr. Lajos Tolnai (6)
8 Edeleny	Dr. Barna Vodila	Ferenc Horvath	Mrs. Barta, Julia Horvath	—	Dr. Zoltan Hatvani	Adolf Szilagyi (6)
9 Encs	Dr. Istvan Bodnar	—	Dr. Gyorgy Boholy	—	Dr. Jozsef Dobozi	Sandor Breitenbach (1); Ferenc Tirpak (6)
10 Satoraljaujhely	Ferenc Beres	—	Karoly Nemeth	—	Pal Juhasz	Dr. Oktav Megay (6)
11 Szerencs	—	Janos Kertesz	—	Istvan Biro	Bela Vitanyi	Zoltan Gyarmati (1); Dr. Lajos Visoczki (6)
12 Leninvaros	—	—	Istvan Bali	—	Dr. Geza Zabos	Istvan Olah (6)
13 Mezokovesd	—	—	Jozsef Molnar	—	Gabor Koncz	Dr. Janos Huk (6)

Csongrad County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Szeged	Miklos Kalocsay	Andras Siklosi	Dr. Laszlo Abraham	Dr. Gyorgy Koppany	Erno Raffay	—
2 Szeged	—	Csaba Veres	Dr. Laszlo Toth	Mihaly Feher	—	Zoltan Kiraly
3 Szeged	Pal Lippay	Janos Soos	—	—	Jozsef Bratinka	Dr. Lajos Csoma; Dr. Vilmos M. Farago
4 Csongrad	—	Istvan Pinter	—	—	Mrs. Istvan Harmath	Dr. Karoly Eke
5 Szentes	—	Karoly Imre	Dr. Gyorgy Horvath	Dr. Ferenc Simon	Dr. Lehel Gyorgy Papp	Imre Keseru
6 Hodmezovasarhely	—	Dr. Lajos Szabo	—	Dr. Antal Endrey	Ferenc Grezsa Jr.	Istvan Lehmann
7 Mako	Ferenc Fazekas	Dr. Sandor Santha	—	Dr. Maria Domokos	Dr. Zoltan Mihaly	—

Csongrad County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Szeged	Dr. Istvan Mar-tonosi	Dr. Ferenc Gesztesi	Mrs. Novak, Anna Halasz	Zoltan Szekely	Dr. Balint Rozsnyai	Dr. Istvan Baba (3), Janos Talpai (6)
2 Szeged	—	Dr. Gyula Krajko	Dr. Mihaly Szabo	Dr. Szilveszter Kispeter	Attila Janko	Istvan Borbas (6); Dr. Endre Levay (3)
3 Szeged	—	Jozsef Perjesi	Jozsef Annus	Gyorgy Szerencses	Edit Rozsa	Zoltan Benke (1); Ferenc Dobay (3); Tibor Nagy Huszein (6)

Csongrad County [Part II] (Continued)

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
4 Csongrad	Szilveszter Forgeteg	—	Laszlo Juhasz	Laszlo Szucs	Zoltan Rantal	Bertalan Balo (6); Attila Morasz (3)
5 Szentes	—	Pal Bertus	Dr. Attila Demeter	—	Bela Laszlo	Janos Torok (6)
6 Hodmezovasarhely	Zsolt Szoboszlai	Ferenc Havranek	Laszlo Harmai	Gyula Szabo	Ferenc Farkas	—
7 Mako	—	Gyula Szilagyi	Matyas Weber	—	Dr. Dezso Kertesz	Dr. Imre Boross (3); Tamas Busa (8); Istvan Vici (6)

Fejer County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Szekesfehervar	Dr. Istvan Nagy	Ignac Kovacs	Istvan Balsay	—	Sandor Andras Szabo	Laszlo Varhegyi
2 Szekesfehervar	Robert Golubeff	Jozsef Pinter	Istvan Pajor	—	Dr. Miklos Horvath	—
3 Dunaujvaros	Zsolt Deak	Gyorgy Toth	Zsolt Domotor	—	Istvan Illesy	Miklos Miskoczi
4 Gardony	—	Pal Meszaros	Janos Hetyei	Istvan Bukovics	Gyorgy Szilasi	Csaba Kracsun; Sandor Peteth
5 Mor	—	Jozsef Horvath	Dr. Boaz Kiss	—	Lajos Zsebok	—
6 Sarbogard	—	Gyorgy Szabo	—	—	Vince Palasti	Dr. Gyorgy Miljanovits
7 Bicske	—	Istvan Izing	Antal Pats	—	Andras Varsanyi	—

Fejer County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Szekesfehervar	—	Janos Szabo	Zoltan Vancsik	—	Jozsef Mozs	—
2 Szekesfehervar	—	Sandor Cseh Bognar	Peter Sudy	—	Dr. Gabor Vilagos	Gyula Mach (1)
3 Dunaujvaros	—	Arpad Loy	Dr. Pal Kovacs	Lajos Vass	Dr. Istvan Felix	—
4 Gardony	Lajos Bogar	—	Jozsef Aron	Peter Csordas	Dr. Bela Bako	Erzsebet Anisfeld (1); Istvan Bukovics (9)
5 Mor	—	Karoly Szekeres	Dr. Peter Siraly	Istvan Kis	Dr. Pal Szagmeiszter	Gyorgy Balogh (6)
6 Sarbogard	Jozsef Szanto	Laszlo Rosta	Sandor Fodor	Csaba Fekete Paris	Zoltan Hajdu	—
7 Bicske	Istvan Barinka	—	Tamas Szabo	—	Andras Meszaros	Dr. Botond Berecz (6); Dr. Ferenc Papp (10)

Gyor-Sopron County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Gyor	—	Dr. Janos Szabo	Mrs. Geber, Marta Giombas	Gyorgy Somogyi	Dr. Laszlo Mednyasszay	Ferenc Toth
2 Gyor	Peter Nemeth	Dr. Attila Ersek	Dr. Janos Rechnitzer	Gyorgy Lengyel	Lajos Bako	Dr. Jozsef Fejes; Jozsef Pal
3 Gyor	—	Gyula Keszhelyi	Laszlo Horvath	Dr. Peter Schmidt	Dr. Andras Bajtay	—

Gyor-Sopron County [Part I] (Continued)

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
4 Mosonmagyarovar	Dr. Janos Pap	Janos Szanto	Dr. Lajos Kosa	Gyula Csefalvay	Dr. Laszlo Szekeyhidi	—
5 Csoma	—	Laszlo Turi	Vilmos Nemeth	Karoly Barth	Dr. Jozsef Nemeth	Dr. Karoly Kurunczi; Jozsef Torma
6 Kapuvar	—	Dr. Gyula Bakody	Pal Tuba	Dr. Jeno Pozsgai	Jozsef Abraham	—
7 Sopron	Dr. Jozsef Szajer	Janos Podor	—	Matyas Firtl	Dr. Laszlo Karpati	Gyula Karolyi

Gyor-Sopron County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Gyor	—	—	Balazs Pozsgai	—	Dorottya Buki	Gyula Fenyo (6)
2 Gyor	—	Sandor Beres	Mrs. Sandor Szabo	Zoltan Koh	Erno Kolozsvari	Dr. Zoltan Alexay (8)
3 Gyor	—	—	Dr. Ferenc Bako	Lajos Pavelczer	Dr. Karoly Rab	—
4 Mosonmagyarovar	—	Karoly Winkler	Laszlo Winkler	—	Jozsef Finta	Gyorgy Fazekas (1); Csaba Nyerges (8)
5 Csoma	—	—	Dr. Karoly Balogh	Dr. Janos Kiss	Janos Balogh	Sandor Balsay (8); Tamas Boda (6); Ferenc Karakai (1)
6 Kapuvar	—	—	Gyula Nyars	—	Dr. Tivadar Horvath	Dr. Kalman Nemeth (6); Rezso Szalai (1)
7 Sopron	—	Denes Kormendi	Imre Pozsgay	—	Dr. Miklos Arszin	—

Hajdu-Bihar County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Debrecen	—	Sandor Cseh	Attila Gyorfi	—	Attila Fejes	Mrs. Istvan Borza
2 Debrecen	Dr. Laszlo Palnik	Jozsef Nagy	—	—	Dr. Akos Gali	Dr. Ede Hetenyi; Dr. Roza Szima
3 Debrecen	Lajos Kosa	Dr. Bela Kovacs	Barnabas Mandi	—	Dr. Gyula Erdo	—
4 Hajduhadhaz-teglas	—	Janos Arany	Sandor Kertesz	Dr. Otto Baba	Sandor Komor	Albert Forian
5 Berettyoujfalu	—	Dr. Attila Bank	Dr. Istvan Ujhelyi	—	Jozsef Sapi	Laszlo Farkas
6 Puspokladany	—	Lajos Farkas	Dr. Kalman Gere	—	Dezso Farkas	—
7 Hajduszoboszlo	—	Dr. Andras Barcsa; Andras Belgyar	Gusztav Lekai	—	Dr. Laszlo Sovago	Dr. Sandor Nagy
8 Balmazujvaros	—	Istvan Kemeny	Dr. Istvan Orcsik	—	Lajos Zsupos	Istvan Burai
9 Hajduboszormeny	—	Dr. Imre Olah; Istvan Racz	Dr. Tibor Almasi	—	Dr. Miklos Nyakas	—

Hajdu-Bihar County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Debrecen	—	Dr. Bela Baranyi	Richard Roder	Bela Barcza	Gyorgy Pal Tabajdi	Janos Albert (1); Mrs. Cseke, Dr. Kornelia Kelemen (11)
2 Debrecen	—	—	Dr. Istvan Orosz	Jozsef Vollein	Dr. Zoltan Bertha	—
3 Debrecen	—	—	Dr. Ferenc Bojan	—	Dr. Mihaly Mozes	Barna Szoke (1)
4 Hajduhadhaz-teglas	Jozsef Csoban	—	Janos Alexa	Csaba Szalai	Pal Gajdos	Dr. Tibor Kovacs (6)
5 Berettyoujfalu	—	Laszlo Szabo	Dr. Zoltan Daroczi	—	Roza Hodosan	Dr. Dezso Tomay (6)
6 Puspokladany	—	Gabor Jakab	Dr. Matyas Szuros	—	Jozsef Ordasi	Sandor Szilagyi (6)
7 Hajduszoboszlo	Gyula Erdei	—	Mrs. Laszlo Torok	—	Janos Domokos	Jozsef Laczko (6); Csaba Sapi (1)
8 Balmazujvaros	Imre Nadasdi	—	Jozsef Csige	—	Jozsef Szekely	Ferenc File (6)
9 Hajduboszormeny	—	Gabor Szekeres	Dr. Jozsef Nagy	Dr. Miklos Nyakas	Dr. Tibor Molnar	Antal Szucs (1); Dr. Mihaly Volosinovszki (6)

Heves County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Eger	Zsuzsanna Farkas	Dr. Peter Banhidy	Zsolt Kadar	Dr. Tamas Lukacs	Bela Szarvas	Dr. Marton Somogyi; Peter Szabo
2 Petervasara & vic.	—	Andras Pifko	Gyorgy Szakacs	Dr. Zoltan Chikan	Jozsef Kelemen	Erno Csabai; Mrs. Istvan Zsedei
3 Gyongyos	Bertalan Korenczi	Imre Peto	Ferenc Csepany	Istvan Reisz	Endre Pokorny	Csaba Csongradi; Csaba Karmann; Sandor Pal; Dr. Janos Thuroczy
4 Hatvan	Janos Kovacs	—	Gyula Horvath	Dr. Lajos Molnar	Dr. Miklos Baranyai	Zsolt Ersek
5 Heves	—	Dr. Miklos Somodi	Laszlo Ozsvari	Laszlo Bossanyi	Jozsef Pongracz	Ferenc Gulyas; Lajos Toth
6 Fuzesabony	—	Mrs. Laszlo Hidvegi	Laszlo Berenyi	Dr. Jozsef Pasztor	Istvan Elek	Dr. Sandor Papp

Heves County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Eger	—	Joachim Vasas	Denes Barsony	Dr. Janos Korompai	Dr. Rudolf Novak	Jozsef Gyertvai (1)
2 Petervasara & vic.	—	Mrs. Tibor Ferencz	Marton Szanto	Gyula Tarjanyi	Laszlo Horvath	Bela Csepregi (12)
3 Gyongyos	—	Istvan Der	Mrs. Sandor Rajki	—	Bertalan Komenczi	Gyula Balazs (3); Dr. Sandor Magda (12)
4 Hatvan	—	Dr. Bela Nagy	Ervin Kisterenyei	—	Dr. Imre Bajusz	Jozsef Vago (12)
5 Heves	—	Bela Sztankovics	Emil Szoke	Pal Miko	Mrs. Kovacs, Magdolna Nagy	Sandor Budai (12); Laszlo Szatmari (3)
6 Fuzesabony	—	Istvan Blaho	Tibor Toth	—	Aniko Horvath	Laszlo Harmati (12)

Jasz-Nagykun Szolnok County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Jaszbereny	—	Istvan Szigeti	Dr. Laszlo Dobos	—	Dr. Laszlo Petho	Dr. Tibor Csabai; Dr. Janos Knorr; Rudolf Kokai; Dr. Zoltan Lukacs
2 Jaszpati	—	Dr. Bela Mizsei	Sandor Torok	—	Dr. Akos Kecskes	Antal Major
3 Szolnok	Attila Varhegyi	Zsolt Posta	Dr. Magdolna Szoro	—	Istvan Halasz	—
4 Szolnok	Dr. Aniko Levai	Tibor Dinka	—	—	Laszlo Petronyak	Jozsef Cserfalvi; Dr. Laszlo Fehervari; Mrs. Dr. Gyula Kovacs
5 Kunszentmarton	—	Dr. Miklos K. Csontos	Dr. Laszlo Sari	—	Istvan Molnar	Laszlo Toth; Janos Tuoczi
6 Mezotur	—	Dr. Valeria Szunyogh	Sandor Perjesi	—	Dr. Albert Toth	Mihaly Lazar; Sandor Mazik
7 Kunhegyes	—	Imre Dogei; Istvan Szelekovszky	Zsigmond Sipos	—	Dr. Lajos Szabo	Sandor Elekes; Dr. Sandor Slezak
8 Karcag	Mihaly Varga	Dr. Laszlo Varga	Peter Boka	—	Dr. Janos Szabo	Gyorgy Fekete

Jasz-Nagykun Szolnok County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Jaszbereny	—	Dr. Gabor Janosi	Dr. Zoltan Jakus	—	Dr. Zoltan Kis	Bela Szabo (6)
2 Jaszpati	—	—	Laszlo Gyarmati	—	Dr. Laszlo Juhasz	Menyhert Janosi (6)
3 Szolnok	—	Ferenc Nagy	Dr. Karoly Szegedi	—	Zoltan Hortobagyi	Jozsef Harasztosi (6)
4 Szolnok	Mihaly Torocsik	Mrs. Janos Pozderka	Libor Kovacs	—	Tamas Fodor	Lajos Pocs (1); Dr. Karoly Stiegler (6)
5 Kunszentmarton	—	—	Istvan Jauernik	—	Dr. Edit Kiss	Gyorgy Fialka (1); Gyorgy Torkos (6)
6 Mezotur	Bela Szeremley	Janos Papp	Dr. Denes Draskovits	Dr. Laszlo Bujdoso	Gyula Arvai	Mihaly Santa (1)
7 Kunhegyes	—	—	Imre Herbaly	Mrs. Imre Mezei	Antal Tolnai	Ignac Turi (1)
8 Karcag	Dr. Mihaly Bugan	—	Jozsef Danyi	—	Lajos Csecskedy	Dr. Dezso Heredy (18); Dr. Janos Kasuba (6)

Komarom-Esztergom County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Tata	Janos Albert	—	Gyozo Hubay	—	Jozsef Pordan	Benedek Benko; Dr. Laszlo Kapolyi; Mrs. Szoda, Eva Mazalin
2 Oroszlany	Robert Ruchti	Laszlo Hanko	—	Dr. Laszlo Benya	Dr. Attila Kalman	—
3 Tata	—	Dr. Janos Markus	Zoltan Kiraly	Dr. Janos Sera	Sandor Szabo	Matyas Kovacs; Janos Zippenfenig
4 Almasfuzito	Zsolt Asboth	Geza Gyimothy	Dr. Miklos Havas	—	Janos Toth-Kurucz	Imre Lendvai

Komarom-Esztergom County [Part I] (Continued)

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
5 Esztergom	Janos Pal Knapp	Ferenc Csoka	Dr. Tamas Nemes; Andras Mihalovics	Dr. Katalin Emese Ugrin	Zsolt Horvath	—

Komarom-Esztergom County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Tata banya	—	Dr. Gyorgy B. Revesz	Laszlo Zsiros	—	Gabor Szalay	Dr. Laszlo Helmle (13); Ferenc Muranyi (1)
2 Oroszlany	—	—	Laszlo Mindszenti	—	Dr. Tamas Freund	Ferenc Kuti (6); Istvan Tirol (1); Vilmos Weirach Wer (13)
3 Tata	—	Tibor Nagy	Dr. Istvan Buhazi; Tibor Nagy	Jeno Nagy	Sandor Deak	Imre Mocher (1); Karoly Toth (6)
4 Almasfuzito	—	—	Andras Bojthe	Gabor Zoltay	Szilard Soleczki	Dr. Istvan Szentirmai (6); Gyorgy Szucs (1)
5 Esztergom	—	—	Dr. Zoltan Haller	—	Dr. Geza Arato	Mrs. Jozsef Juhasz (1); Jozsef Sasvari (6)

Nograd County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Salgotarjan	—	Dr. Sandor Imre	Ferenc Szabo	—	Zoltan Speidl	Andras Dombi; Dr. Laszlo Sandor
2 Paszto	—	—	Ferenc Kovacs; Mrs. Dr. Kovesi, Meli Bolyky; Ildiko Letovai	Sandor Toth	Jozsef Kadarkuti	Laszlo Mate; Tibor Petreczky; Gabor Sandor
3 Szecseny	Timea Barany	Laszlo Fenes	—	Peter Juhasz	Oszkar Frisch	Imre Geczy; Dr. Bela Havasi; Bela Valkar
4 Balassagyarmat	Tibor Toth	Pal Hutyian	—	Gabor Kovacs	Laszlo Csekey	Dr. Bela Zomborka

Nograd County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Salgotarjan	—	Dr. Tibor Szilagyi	Dr. Jozsef Rozgonyi	Andras Kovacs	Istvan Gusztos	Jozsef Horvath (1); Istvan Simon (6)
2 Paszto	—	Jeno Somogyi	Istvan Berkes Vida	—	Dr. Laszlo Novak	Istvan Berkes Vida (6); Elemer Csemery (14); Jozsef Erki (1); Sandor Faludi (3)
3 Szecseny	—	Otto Kalmar	Sandor Hausel	Dr. Andras Boholy	Dr. Attila Kakuk	Gabor Frenkl (1); Peter Hardi (3); Dr. Zoltan Miklos (6)
4 Balassagyarmat	—	Dr. Imre Geczy	Janos Arato	—	Janos Hlacsok	Zoltan Medveczki (8); Dr. Laszlo Ratz (6)

POLITICAL
JPRS-EER-90-047
6 April 1990
Pest County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Szob	—	Vilmos Bereczky	Bela Pasztor; Ferenc Ritzl	Dr. Gyula Meszaros	Zoltan Bogardi	—
2 Vac	Dr. Tibor Kenez	Dr. Attila Gruber	—	Ferenc Bartos	Tamas Katona	Ervin Petho
3 Dunakeszi	—	Laszlo Albert; Janos Cselotei	Dr. Istvan Kukorelli	Dr. Tamas A. Varga	Janos Sz. Toth	Dr. Janos Verboczky
4 Godollo	—	Laszlo Csuja	—	Dr. Ferenc Szakal	Gabor Roszik	—
5 Aszod	Bela Glattfelder	Mrs. Istvan Torda	—	Dr. Mihaly Peter	Dr. Pal Becker	Dr. Antal Basa; Mrs. Fischl, Dr. Anna Horvath; Andras Godor; Tibor Kalna; Dr. Peter Toth
6 Nagykata	—	Dr. Karoly Hajnal	—	Dr. Istvan Sandor	Gabor Farkas	—
7 Monor	Gabor Hegely	Zoltan Horogh	—	—	Dr. Gabor Torok	Janos Csanyi; Mrs. Ferenc Dobos; Istvan Szegedi; Dr. Sandor Tenke
8 Erd	Andras T. Meszaros	Istvan Prepeliczay	—	Laszlo Isaak	Dr. Laszlo Kovacs	Imre Antal; Dr. Istvan Gotzinger
9 Budaors	—	Istvan Ronahaty	Jozsef Joos	Ivan Lajos Szenes	Karoly Javor	Dr. Laszlo Kaszap
10 Pilisvorosvar	Attila Folsz	Miklos Borz	—	Dr. Jeno Miklos Darko	Rudolf Szauter	—
11 Szentendre	—	Sandor Varhegyi	—	Dr. Karoly Philipovics	Dr. Peter Szel	Andras Szalai; Mihaly Vicstka
12 Szigetszentmiklos	—	Dr. Matyas Hellemeczy	—	—	Almos Fazakas	Sandor Levai
13 Rackeve	—	Jozsef Frank; Istvan Sipos	—	Janos Forgacs	Dr. Ferenc Vona	Dr. Laszlo Majos
14 Dabas	—	Istvan Horvath	Jozsef Tanyi	Jozsef Radoczy	Laszlo Lorantfy	Karoly Donti; Dr. Istvan Fodor
15 Cegled	Attila Laszip	Bela Arany	Laszlo Krekacs	—	Dr. Miklos Reti	Dr. Janos Gyarmati
16 Nagykoros	—	Albert Huszar	—	—	Dr. Sandor Kulin	—

Pest County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Szob	—	—	Laszlo Balogh	Bela Farkas	Jozsef Ormandy	—
2 Vac	—	—	Laszlo Labai	—	Istvan Vass	Janos Csuka (6)
3 Dunakeszi	—	—	Lajos Varga	—	Dr. Robert Kiss	—
4 Godollo	Mrs. Vass, Ilona Nyeki	—	Laszlo Korosfoi	—	Dr. Antal Hajagos	Janos Varga (1)
5 Aszod	—	—	Attila Hajdu	—	Geza Nadas	Ferenc Levai (6)
6 Nagykata	—	—	Andras Banati	Erno Ormandlaky	Mrs. Gyorgy Bodrogi	Karoly Racsko (6) Sandor Vonnak (1)
7 Monor	Laszlo Olah	—	Csaba Hamori	Laszlo Veres	Mrs. Dr. Miklos Jos	Karoly Czvikli (6); Tibor Kover (4); Karoly Meszaros (1)
8 Erd	—	—	Janos Pataki	—	Jozsef Gyurcsok	Ferenc Kunszabo (6)

Pest County [Part II] (Continued)

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
9 Budaors	Dr. Bela Locsmandy	—	Imre Zink	Mrs. Gellert Horvath	Peter Szuhay	—
10 Pilisvorosvar	Jeno Korosi	—	Dr. Jozsef Andrasko	—	Miklos Hajdufy	—
11 Szentendre	—	—	Gabor Miakich	—	Gyorgyi Bindorffer	—
12 Szigetszentmiklos	—	—	Ferenc Bozso	—	Gabor Kuncze	—
13 Rackeve	—	—	Mihaly Kocsis	—	Mrs. Czombos, Eva Venczel	Istvan Gyimesi (1); Sandor Juhasz (6)
14 Dabas	—	—	Imre Gondos	—	Ferenc Mala	Imre Moricz (6)
15 Cegled	—	—	Istvan Giba	—	Dr. Dezso Suranyi	Laszlo Krekacs (6)
16 Nagykoros	Dr. Zoltan Koltay	—	Dr. Laszlo Lakos	—	Dr. Tibor Abraham	Bela Makai (1); Jozsef Mari (4)

Somogy County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Kaposvar	—	Ferenc Lengyel	Dr. Janos Jasinka	—	—	Dr. Lajos Hegedus; Bela Kiraly
2 Kaposvar	Zoltan Makai	Mrs. Dr. Laszlo Tarjan	Ferenc Kosa	—	Gyorgy Szigetvari	Bertalan Budai
3 Siofok	—	Gellert Barkoczy	Dr. Ferenc Novak	—	Janos Horvath	Endre Milan
4 Boglarielle	—	Bela Nemeth	—	—	Dr. Antal Gaal	Dr. Erno Agoston; Janos Csere; Istvan Gyenesei; Sandor Laszlo
5 Marcali	—	Jozsef Istvan	Dr. Ferenc Horvath	Miklos Borczi	Ferenc Katai	Imre Havanecz; Dr. Henrik Szijarto; Tihamer Toth
6 Nagyatad	Maria Szabo	Dr. Imre Sipos	Dr. Ferenc Horvath	—	Tamas Nagybacska	—

Somogy County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Kaposvar	—	Dr. Maria Horvath	Dr. Tibor De Sorgo	—	—	Dr. Gyula Gueth (15)
2 Kaposvar	—	Imre Szabo	Andras Pasztohy	—	Dr. Gabor Pogany	Karoly Keszericze (15); Ferenc Kosa (6)
3 Siofok	Csaba Varga	—	Dr. Jozsef Hazas	Albert Racz	Dr. Andras Paris	Sandor Katona (1); Ferenc Kovacs (6); Dr. Vilmos Olah (16)
4 Boglarielle	Dr. Sandor Gyenis	—	Gyula Horn	—	Ferenc Kardos	—
5 Marcali	—	—	Dr. Tamas Suchmann	Dr. Janos Novak	Peter Vermes	Laszlo Farkas (16); Istvan Magyar (6); Karoly Szita (8); Jozsef Zsok (1)

Somogy County [Part II] (Continued)

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
6 Nagyatad	—	—	Laszlo Beke	Jozsef Bakos	Zoltan Orzsi	Jozsef Koszoru (1); Bela Liptak (8); Dr. Kalman Magyar (16); Mrs. Dr. Pal Solti (15); Dr. Sandor Visnyei (6)

Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Nyiregyhaza	Istvan Szent-Kiralyi	Dr. Miklos Nagy	Odon Merza	Mrs. Tibor Antaloczy	Dr. Peter Takacs	Dr. Laszlo Hellemezy
2 Nyiregyhaza	Laszlo Madi	Jozsef Gombos	Dr. Akos Bodnar	Istvan Paal	Dr. Geza Szilassy	Gyorgy Tarnavolgyi
3 Tiszavasvari	—	Mrs. Antal Farkas	—	Istvan Guth	Istvan Varkonyi	Sandor Turko
4 Nagykallo	Kristof Kallay	Dr. Bertalan Kun; Dr. Ferenc Veress	Mrs. Soltesz, Ilona Padar	Kristof Kallay	Antal Pekk	Karoly Estok
5 Baktalorant-haza	—	Pal Balint	Jozsef Szabados	Dr. Erno Ivan	Ferenc Jakab	Dr. Zoltan Bekesi
6 Nyirbator	—	Dr. Tibor Kiss	Karoly Kith	Jozsef Somos	Dr. Laszlo Szedrei	Dr. Laszlo Toth
7 Kisvarda	—	Balazs Revesz	Zoltan Sarosy	Laszlo Sesztak	Dr. Karoly Mezey	Antal Szarvadi
8 Vasarosnameny	—	Gyula Szabo	Arpad Mate Toth	Istvan Szervanszky	Sandor M Szucs	Andras Laszlo
9 Mateszalka	Gabor Kicsak	Dr. Jozsef Tor-gyan	Dr. Miklos Vekony	Jozsef Rati	Dr. Laszlo More	Istvan Szakacs
10 Fehergyarmat	Zsigmond Siket	Dr. Sandor Kavassy	Jozsef Konya	Gabor Balogh	Laszlo Toth	Dr. Jozsef Nota

Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Nyiregyhaza	—	Mrs. Szolosi, Eva Fitos	Ferenc Kosa	—	Geza Laborczi	Dr. Bela Hajnal (13); Odon Merza (6); Gabor Somos (1)
2 Nyiregyhaza	—	Laszlo Petho	Dr. Ferenc Baja	—	Dr. Istvan Lenti	Miklos Donka (1)
3 Tiszavasvari	Dr. Arpad Olajos	Janos Berecz	Laszlo Kiss	—	Laszlo Makkai	Dr. Imre Bokor (1); Laszlo Karako (6); Laszlo Vajda (17)
4 Nagykallo	Janos Toth	—	Gyula Erdei	—	Kristof Kallay	Jozsef Gulyas (6); Laszlo Horvath (1)
5 Baktalorant-haza	—	—	Janos Lucza	Mihaly Szucs	Laszlo Kozma	Laszlo Nagylucksay (1); Elemer Pal (6)
6 Nyirbator	—	—	Dr. Janos Veres	—	Zsolt Fejes	Miklos Berecz (1); Karoly Kith (6); Laszlo Nagy (1)
7 Kisvarda	—	Tibor Koi	Dr. Imre Szabo	—	Mrs. Dr. Bela Kriveczky	Arpad Bodzas (6); Ferenc Heiner (1); Gyula Naday (10)

Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg County [Part III] (Continued)

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
8 Vasarosnameny	—	—	Dr. Miklos Kelemen	—	Tamas Ivanyi	Imre Abrok (6); Barna Toros (1)
9 Mateszalka	Dr. Mihaly Czine	Imre Fabian	Dr. Karoly Varga	—	Istvan Domotor	Miklos Szanto (1); Dr. Lajos Takacs (6)
10 Fehergyarmat	—	Mihaly Pacza	Dr. Bela Laszlo	—	Zsigmond Siket	Karoly Varga (1); Mrs. Varga, Ildiko Piros (6)

Tolna County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Szekszard	Peter Kuczko	Sandor Farkas	—	Dr. Miklos Palos	Dr. Gabor Ternak	—
2 Bonyhad	—	Jozsef Kacsor	—	Dr. Attila Szech- enyi	Janos Figler	Dr. Laszlo Bucsi; Dr. Tibor Dallos; Peter Jakli
3 Dombovar	Jozsef Kling	Dr. Laszlo Fenyes	Dr. Jozsef Soly- mosi	Jozsef Bea	Gyorgy Ohnmacht	Istvan Kismodi; Zoltan Laszlo
4 Paks	—	Istvan Varga	—	Dr. Istvan Fazekas	Lajos Horvath	—
5 Tamasi	—	Gyorgy Csike	Janos Varga	Dr. Laszlo Toth	Dr. Ibolya David	Dr. Gyula Arban- asz; Gyula Hegedus

Tolna County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Szekszard	Dr. Judit Zaborszky	Zoltan Benko	Gyorgy Janosi	Pal Istvan Kis	Sandor Polyak	Dr. Attila Rozsas (1); Dr. Zoltan Toth (2)
2 Bonyhad	Jozsef Pal	—	Dr. Janos Simon	Zoltan Szeles	Jozsef Simony	Janos Ferenczi (6)
3 Dombovar	—	—	Dr. Jozsef Kiss	—	Imre Barcza	Konrad Klein (2)
4 Paks	—	—	Dr. Imre Radochay	—	Attila Sarhegyi	Dr. Peter Kutas (6); Emil Morgasi (1)
5 Tamasi	Ferenc Lonhrad	Janos Beres	Dr. Laszlo Takacs	—	Mrs. Kiraly, Stefania Bekefi	—

Vas County [Part I]

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Szombathely	Agota Hajnal	—	Janos Heckenast	Dr. Emma Nemeth	Dr. Csaba Hende	Gabor Kozma; Geza Toth
2 Szombathely	Ferenc Galavits	Bela Nemeth	Dr. Laszlo Szabo	Endre Haluskay	Adam Karoly	Sandor Babos
3 Koszeg	Laszlo Kovacs	Janos Eles	Tamas Basthy	Dr. Arpad Kovacs	Tamas Csapo	—
4 Sarvar	—	Dr. Tibor Denes	Otto Inzel	Miklos Peter Lukats	Dr. Ferenc Gombos	Laszlo Hulik
5 Kormend	—	Dezso Balogh	Imre Meszaros	Dr. Istvan Csornyi	Lajos Fur	Dr. Erzsebet Szabo

POLITICAL

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Vas County [Part II]						
Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Szombathely	—	Pal Rapli	Dr. Gyorgy Ipkovich	Laszlo Pek	Dr. Miklos Hanko Farago	—
2 Szombathely	—	—	Jozsef Simon	—	Jeno Racskai	Gyula Nemes (6)
3 Koszeg	Dr. Karoly Polgar	—	Nandor Felcsiki	—	Vilmos Horvath	Bertalan Mayer (6)
4 Sarvar	Dr. Istvan Poczik	Lajos Matocza	Imre Szabo	—	Dr. Endre Monostori	Dr. Ferenc Szele (6)
5 Kormend	—	—	Dr. Ferenc Stipkovits	—	Bela Meszaros	Gyorgy Imre Dancsecs (17); Dr. Kalman Suto (6)

Veszprem County [Part I]						
Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Ajka	—	Dr. Gyorgy Vilagos	Dr. Istvan Mikola	—	Dr. Erzsebet Pusztai	Dr. Laszlo Jarfas; Endre Tornai; Miklos Varga
2 Balatonfured	—	Imre Csonka	Istvan Szabo	Dr. Laszlo Jan	Dr. Tamas Szabo	Mrs. Szelenyi, Dr. Kata Peterfia
3 Papa	Dr. Laszlo Kover	Bela Janosa	Mrs. Lajos Schlecht	—	Dr. Tibor Penzes	—
4 Tapolca	—	Laszlo Banusz	Janos Sebok	Laszlo Czapary	Istvan Csizmadia	Mrs. Szabó, Erzsebet Kovacs
5 Varpalota	Peter Patonai	Laszlo Czifra	Janos Csovari	Janos Kovacs	Ferenc Schmidt	Tibor Fakasz
6 Veszprem	—	Ferenc Csizmadia	Lajos Tatay	Pal Marik	Dr. Balazs Horvath	—
7 Veszprem	Zsuzsa Szelenyi	Istvan Bella	Dr. Jozsef Tolgyesi	Dr. Bela Musulin	Dr. Sandor Papp	—

Veszprem County [Part II]						
Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Ajka	—	—	Istvan Kalocsan	Sandor Molnar	Peter Madai	—
2 Balatonfured	—	—	Dr. Istvan Ungvari	Istvan Orosz	Gyula Szor	—
3 Papa	—	Gabor Legman	Zoltan Gogos	Mrs. Imre Gyimrothi Gyenge	Dr. Laszlo Kover	Karoly Farkas (6); Gyorgy Fazekas (1)
4 Tapolca	—	—	Tamas Toth	Robert Czapp	Dr. Gyula Saary	Otto Kiss (6)
5 Varpalota	—	Csaba Rozsa	Tibor Leszkovszki	Dr. Istvan Kormoczi	Dr. Pal Huszar	Dr. Laszlo Szoke (1)
6 Veszprem	Emod Migray	—	Istvan Asztalos	Bela Gelencser	Dr. Lajos Schiszier	—
7 Veszprem	—	Gyula Thurmer	Bela Csabai	Dr. Laszlo Jozsa	Csaba D Veress	—

Zala County [Part I]						
Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
1 Zalaegerszeg	Csaba Bayer	Kalman Czoma	—	Rudolf Friedreich	Dr. Gyula Marx	—
2 Nagykanizsa	—	Janos Siklosi	Laszlo Harkany	Dr. Ferenc Balogh	Attila Tranoczky	—
3 Keszhely	—	Dr. Istvan Ecker	—	Dr. Sandor Gardos	Denes Csengy	Dr. Laszlo Czoma

Zala County [Part I] (Continued)

Voting District	FIDESZ	FKgP	HVK	KDNP	MDF	IND
4 Zalaszentgrot	Robert Tamasa	Janos Szunyogh	Lajos Meszaros; Dr. Laszlo Belso	Dr. Istvan Fekete	Robert Rudics	Ferenc (Fero) Nagy
5 Lenti	—	Ferenc Antalics	Dr. Denes Palfi	Dr. Ferenc Szabo	Dr. Tihamer Toth	Dr. Elemer Papp

Zala County [Part II]

Voting District	MNP	MSZMP	MSZP	MSZDP	SZDSZ	MISC
1 Zalaegerszeg	—	Dr. Lajos Banfai	Mrs. Karasz, Dr. Lidia Racz	Janos Tuboly	Dr. Istvan Szigethy	Gyorgy Kovacs (15); Dr. Gyula Szabados (1)
2 Nagykanizsa	—	Dr. Jozsef Vass	Dr. Laszlo Vari	—	Karoly Solti	Dr. Ferenc Gaspar (1); Dr. Istvan Kotnyek (6)
3 Keszthely	—	Jozsef Deak	Dr. Ferenc Ligetvari	—	Pal Villanyi	Sandor Angyalosi (6)
4 Zalaszentgrot	Gabor Berkes	—	Laszlo Varga	—	Miklos Ari	Dr. Lajos Meszaros (6); Rudolf Peter (6)
5 Lenti	—	—	Balazs Szabo	Jozsef Pal	Lajos Varga	Dr. Barnabas Belinszky (1); Antal Fincza (15)

POLAND

Provincial Agrarian Parties Unite for Upcoming Elections

90EP0404A Warsaw DZIENNIK LUDOWY in Polish
12 Jan 90 p 2

[Article: "Peasant Movement Chronicle"]

[Excerpts] The joint meeting of the voivodship administration boards of the Polish Peasant Party, or PSL, and the Polish Peasant Party—Rebirth could be considered a step toward unification of the peasant movement in Bydgoszcz Voivodship.

A joint decision was made that the activists of these two streams from now on would form a single peasant movement in the voivodship, above all, a grassroots peasant movement. It is a question of bringing together as many of the two parties' former members and allies as possible, along with the small numbers of Polish Peasant Party—Solidarity members in Bydgoszcz. In order to activate the rural political and economic community, efforts will be made to recruit new members that have never been active before.

This will take effect immediately and continue until the end of this February at open meetings of the founding circles of the PSL.

In March there should be gmina congresses of the unified PSL, and a voivodship congress by mid-April.

The Bydgoszcz PSL leaders issued a joint communique:

The future of the Polish countryside and the nation's nutrition depend on a single strong political party, the Polish Peasant Party. Recognizing the absolute necessity of bolstering democratic principles in government functioning, the peasant movement can only be represented in the parliament by a strong Polish Peasant Party. [passage omitted]

* * *

On 3 January, there was a meeting in Tarnow between the representatives of the main components of the peasant movement in Tarnow Voivodship: PSL—Rebirth, PSL, Rural Solidarity, the Tarnow Social Committee of the Rebirth Peasant Movement, and ZMW Wici Rural Youth Movement.

The talks were concentrated on all essential actions leading to unity. In connection with the absence of major differences in program ideology, the people attending the meeting recognized it was necessary to conduct a joint election-organization campaign. The campaign will be coordinated by the PSL Voivodship Organizing Commission, which was appointed at the meeting. Sejm Deputy Wladyslaw Zabinski, chairman of the Commission to Unite PSL—Rebirth, was named chairman of the PSL Voivodship Organizing Commission.

Another step toward unification of the peasant movement was made in Kielce on 9 January. There was a meeting of the temporary ZW boards: PSL—Rebirth and PSL, which were chaired by Alfred Domagalski and Jozef Teliga.

A commission was created to prepare the documents and conduct a joint election-organization campaign in the cells and groups of PSL—Rebirth and PSL in Kielce Voivodship, and as a result to create a single peasant party.

It was also decided that efforts should be combined for elections to future self-governing bodies and the people's councils. With this thought in mind a joint self-government commission was created, and organizational preparations were undertaken.

Because Kielce peasant movement activists are disturbed by the situation in agriculture and rural areas, they are presenting a common critical position concerning these problems. It will be sent shortly to the marshals of the Sejm and Senate. [passage omitted]

Regional Solidarity Meetings; Leadership, Delegate Elections

*90EP0404C Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY
in Polish 29 Jan 90 pp 1-2*

[PAP Article: "Regional Meeting of Solidarity Delegates: Trade Union or Political Party?"]

[Text] Several regions held general meetings of NSZZ Solidarity delegates last Saturday and Sunday.

The discussion of the Przemysl region's delegates concentrated on trying to minimize the effects of unemployment, reduce environmental problems, and bolster unity within the union, an essential condition for effective protection of workers' rights. For example, it was emphasized that within the context of the threat of unemployment, it was not a question of defending merely union members but of standing up for the most skilled employees. Only then will the basic principles of Solidarity as a social justice movement be fulfilled. Marek Kaminski, a 38-year old printer, was named chairman of the regional administration.

One of the most important elements in the program discussion during the second session of the general meeting of delegates in Gorzow Wielkopolski was whether Solidarity is to be a trade union or a political party. Ryszard Maciejewski of the Kostrzyn paper plants did not think that there has been any precise statement as to just what Solidarity is. This means that today it has fewer members than when it was founded. Rafal Zapadka of Gorzow thought that it was too soon to make the union nonpolitical, because no other political force with the moral authority of the Solidarity social movement has been developed in Poland yet. Leaders of the 20,000-member regional organization were appointed. Andrzej Radlinski was elected chairman a week ago.

Janusz Palubicki, a 43-year old art historian employed at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, was elected chairman of the NSZZ Solidarity administration for the Greater Poland Region. Many important issues were raised in the discussion, including preparations for the self-government elections, job protection, and defending

people from being supposedly laid off for economic reasons when in fact they are being let go for political reasons.

At the general meeting of Lodz Region delegates, recent divisions which have not yet disappeared were evident, expressed, for example, in a proposal for a vote of "no confidence" against Andrzej Slowik, who was recently elected chairman of the board. The motion was withdrawn after an emotion-laden discussion. Procedural matters took up a great deal of time, and little time remained to discuss the program. Most of the delegates came out in favor of a departure from calling people to account in Lodz and in favor of actively taking up union problems.

Wroclaw Political Parties Unite for Elections, City Development

*90EP0407A Wroclaw SPRAWY I LUDZIE in Polish
No. 7, 15 Feb 90 p 6*

[Communiqué issued by Adam Plesnar, press spokesman, Wroclaw Democratic Coalition: "Communiqué on the Founding of the Wroclaw Democratic Coalition"]

[Text] On 12 February 1990, the Wroclaw Democratic Coalition was created by the following political groups: the Confederation of Independent Poland, the Polish Green Party, the Movement for Alternative Thinking, the Movement of Free Democrats, the Labor Party, and the Wroclaw Club for Understanding Beyond Divisions.

The coalition is open to all persons and groups conducting social and political action who value the role of citizen dialogue and seek the most appropriate way to regenerate collective life.

The Wroclaw Democratic Coalition is setting the following goals for itself:

1. Mobilize civic activity to remove all totalitarian vestiges from the political, social, and economic system of the Polish Republic.
2. Participate in creating democratic institutions on the national, regional, and local level.
3. Create foundations for the city's full financial independence and the effective control of city expenditures.
4. Oppose the tendencies of particular political forces and their power blocks to maintain or obtain a monopolistic position in the Polish government.
5. Develop and implement a real program of development for Wroclaw, with particular attention to the following: public health and environmental protection, public security and propriety of production, services and trade, housing construction, urban transportation and communication, science, education and culture, social welfare for the most needy, the elderly, and the handicapped, and foreign contacts.
6. Promotion of economic and social activity among groups and individuals.

7. Support for various forms of self-government.
8. Implementation of basic structural and personnel changes in bodies of the state and economic administration in Wroclaw, in keeping with the principles of rationality, skill, and integrity.
9. Preparation of coalition candidates for council member and the waging of election campaigns on their behalf.

The Wroclaw Democratic Coalition is open to all groups and persons interested in regional self-government and candidacy in the upcoming municipal elections. It supports all sorts of social initiative in this regard. It is particularly interested in cooperating with citizens committees and election committees.

The Wroclaw Democratic Coalition considers it possible to establish, within the framework of a joint election block, one or more lists of candidates in municipal elections in Wroclaw.

The groups and persons going to make up the Wroclaw Democratic Coalition will maintain complete organizational and political-ideological autonomy and have complete freedom to present their views, rationale, and programs.

Adam Plesnar has been appointed press spokesman for the Wroclaw Democratic Coalition.

Members of the Polish Socialist Party-Democratic Revolution and the Union for Real Politics will participate in the work of the Wroclaw Democratic Coalition as observers.

The Wroclaw Democratic Coalition requests that proposals and offers of cooperation be addressed to the secretariat: 114 Aleje Przodownikow Pracy, no. 5, 53-203 Wroclaw. The secretariat is open Wednesdays and Thursdays from Noon until 1800.

Press spokesman for the Wroclaw Democratic Coalition

Adam Plesnar

Greens Leader Fijalkowski on Split, Party Activities, Membership

90EP0406A Wroclaw SPRAWY I LUDZIE in Polish No. 5, 1 Feb 90 p 8

[Interview with Mariusz Fijalkowski, Wroclaw regional spokesman, Polish Green Party, by Stanislaw Lejda; place and date not given: "Have Ecology in His Bones"]

[Text] [SPRAWY I LUDZIE] What does the present situation in the Polish Green Party, the PPZ, look like? Until recently it was divided into three factions.

[Fijalkowski] The factions still exist. We have observed that most people who are doing something in the PPZ gather around us or Mr. Fura's faction. The party has also been recognized by the Green International, which

has its headquarters in Brussels. We became an observer-member. The Lithuanian Green Party and Bulgarian Ekoglasnost operate there under the same principles. So we're the sole representative of the Polish "greens" abroad. But insofar as the situation in Poland is concerned, I think that all the factions will come together at the next party congress, because such a split today is not only nonpolitical. It's absolutely ridiculous.

[SPRAWY I LUDZIE] Is the Fura faction operating in Lower Silesia?

[Fijalkowski] Yes. The strongest "green" center, which has about 150 members and many sympathizers, is located in Jelenia Gora. There's a PPZ group in Legnica. Another is being formed. Walbrzych already has three groups and is a region, like Wroclaw. According to the by-laws, when there are three local groups operating in a given voivodship, they can form a region. But we're not interested in creating structures, because the vitality of our ranks will be determined by our activity, not our numbers.

[SPRAWY I LUDZIE] So what have you done up until now?

[Fijalkowski] Last December we met in Szklarska Poreba with 20 representatives of green parties from the FRG. We exchanged information and made interesting contacts with various parts of West Germany. This will soon permit us to enter into economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with the "greens" in the FRG. As a region, and in the future as the headquarters of the Lower Silesian Voivodship, we are developing contacts with Hesse, especially with Wroclaw's sister city, Wiesbaden.

Insofar as other contacts are concerned, we've made them with the computer institute on Mloda Gwardia Street doing ecological monitoring and with the new Elwroeco facility. It will produce monitoring equipment for CEMA countries. On the basis of these two companies, in February we want to gather all people working professionally on behalf of ecology in Wroclaw Voivodship and organize a minisymposium, which would have a communique like this: We should finally take up concrete ecological work, show society the way professional ecologists see the country's becoming involved in this movement in this difficult situation, a movement that will work to improve food quality, clean up the environment, and do anything related to improving our physical and psychological well-being.

[SPRAWY I LUDZIE] There have been plenty of fine slogans in the past too, but things didn't go so well with carrying out the concepts they envisioned. How does the PPZ intend to catch up with "improving our well-being"?

[Fijalkowski] Each of us is professionally involved in some aspect of ecology. For me, for example, it's solid waste. What counts with us is not political demagogic, only knowledge, which can form links in a chain to provide the impetus for creating a program that could be put under our country's economic program. For

example, we've had to tell people that if there's a decline now in the consumption of milk and dairy products, then this is the best time to begin the fight for product quality.

[SPRAWY I LUDZIE] Is it really that bad?

[Fijalkowski] Absolutely awful. The analyses of the sanitary testing stations prove it. Milk contains a very great deal of hormonal substances and antibiotics, which, among other things, explains why our children and young people get sick so often. All admissible levels on this are being exceeded. I mentioned the problem of milk in Poland, while I was talking to colleagues from the FRG. They told me we should determine precisely whether antibiotics or hormonal substances are present or not, and, if so, which, because some of them are needed by the body and can improve a person's condition. It may be that the West German "greens" will help us set up at least one station to test milk quickly on the farm, at the milk collection centers, on the producer's premises, and at the distributor's. Then we will be able to see the stage at which it is being "improved" the most.

[SPRAWY I LUDZIE] You're going to do research with the Germans' help. It's bound to show what we already know, that the milk's basically not fit for consumption. Then you'll send these results to the officials, where, as usual, they'll wind up in a desk drawer.

[Fijalkowski] Not according to the law. As a party we can sentence any producer of a product unfit for consumption. Because this is the case with milk and dairy products, we'll turn the district milk cooperatives over to the court. The Central Union of Dairy Cooperatives too, if it all lasts that long.

[SPRAWY I LUDZIE] When should we be expecting this?

[Fijalkowski] I think that within the next month, 2 at the outside.

[SPRAWY I LUDZIE] This would be a spectacular action, in the style of the West. The Germans were in Poland. They fight to protect the environment in a way which we too can see from Poland, but in Poland you don't hear anything about what the PPZ is doing.

[Fijalkowski] We conducted such actions in Lower Silesia. In Jelenia Gora there was a symbolic "forest funeral." It was about the destruction of standing timber in the Izer Mountains. An earlier campaign of ours in Boleslawiec concerned the Soviet Army's training ground on the land there. During maneuvers under heavy fire, these forests burn, but neither our fire fighters nor our natural preservation service is allowed onto the land. Then afterwards the Russians somehow determine how much forest has been burned and plant new trees. As a result, while there used to be a 30-100 year forest growing, now there's a one to two year forest. So we gathered signatures to a petition to the government for the Soviet Army to let a certain number of fire fighting units onto the land when a fire in the forest needs putting

out. It seems to me that when we're talking about spontaneous natural forces, military secrets should not stand in the way of handling them.

[SPRAWY I LUDZIE] Since we're talking about actions, protests, and the like, what's the PPZ's stand on such drastic methods of fighting to protect the environment as the hunger strike against the construction of the nuclear power plant in Zarnowiec?

[Fijalkowski] In favor. I'm whole-heartedly for those people who—no hiding it—suffered. Especially since nobody today is in a position to guarantee that Zarnowiec won't one day become another Chernobyl. And this is why these people, at the cost of the greatest dedication, at the price of their own health, fight for some sort of ideal, and this commands respect. I've got to tell you here that the money thrown at Zarnowiec would have sufficed for a very large number of small hydroelectric plants, wind-powered facilities, and so on, which have been neglected during the last 45 years. I suspect they'd provide as much electricity as a nuclear plant.

[SPRAWY I LUDZIE] Let's get back to the PPZ. What will its efforts be devoted to in Lower Silesia in the immediate future?

[Fijalkowski] First, we plan to invite experts from all the ecological specialties to the regional scientific council, because we want our statements to be authoritative, so that nobody can undermine them. Our second task is to increase the PPZ's numbers. By 1990 we want to have about 1,500 members in Lower Silesia. We could, of course, take in many more, but the FRG green party has 63,000 members out of a population of 70 million, and the whole party in Denmark has just 640 people. In the FRG nearly every "green" is sort of a cadre member of the party, available at a moment's notice. We'd like to use such a model in our country, so that a PPZ member's awareness would be so high that he'd have ecology in his bones. The third issue is to develop a list of tasks which were not accomplished in 1989 and should be carried out in 1990, and then systematically monitor their implementation. This would be based on the agreements of the roundtable's ecological affairs group. The fourth task is to work out at least a five-year program for PPZ, presenting how we, the Wroclaw region, envision the voivodship's development. Because we are a political party, we are interested not only in ecology but also the economy and all social and political life. I think that such a program will be created in the not-too-distant future.

[SPRAWY I LUDZIE] You didn't put up any candidates to stand for election to the Sejm and Senate. Elections to the regional self-governing bodies will probably be speeded up. Will the PPZ take part in them?

[Fijalkowski] This is one of the region's tasks. Alongside the Movement for Alternative Thinking, the Union of Free Democrats, the Labor Party, and so on, we are part of the Democratic Center, the CD, so we have no intention of going head to head in the elections against

other strong groups in the CD. Instead, we're going to help one another, because I've got to tell you that the people elected to the various representative bodies are not following through on their election programs in the area of ecology at all, although everyone promised faithfully to take up this problem.

[SPRAWY I LUDZIE] What does the term "everyone" mean?

[Fijalkowski] The political forces presently in power, or rather, those who represent these forces in the Sejm, the Senate, and the government. This is why we "greens," through our candidates to the regional self-government, are going to want to put the problem of ecology ahead of economic and political matters.

Democratic Party Deputies Criticize Party Leadership

90EP0404B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 25 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Maciej Urbaniak: "Severe Clash"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The club meeting of the SD [Democratic Party] started off with a search for a new chairman, but Zbigniew Rudnicki never did reach the conference hall. Deputy Tadeusz Dziuba read a declaration signed by a group of five deputies criticizing the activity of the SD leadership. They called for the formation of a movement called "SD '90" under the auspices of the party. Its goal would be to form a confederation of political parties and groups which would write into their programs the freedom and sovereignty of the Polish Republic, respect for national traditions and civil rights, and modern economic liberalism, along with a condemnation of communist ideology.

There were many hours of very heated discussion, involving quarrels over more than mere personnel. Jerzy Robert Nowak, representing the Presidium of SD's Central Committee, expanded upon the rudimentary information presented by Deputy Tadeusz Bien and decided to disclose one more argument against Jerzy Jozwiak. He talked in particular about the circumstances which surrounded the creation of the coalition between the OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club] and the ZSL [United Peoples Party] and SD. Jozwiak had been opposed to this coalition up until just about the last moment. He forestalled the creation of it for several days. The decision was finally forced on him by Nowak and central committee secretaries Tadeusz Rymaszewicz and Andrzej Lewinski, after they threatened a party split. The club's deliberations went on late into the night. The club elected a new chairman, Deputy Bien, who had been one of the signers of the declaration. [passage omitted]

YUGOSLAVIA

Kosovo Writer Qosja Analyzes Fall of Villasi

90EB0207C Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
16 Jan 90 pp 30-31

[Article by Rexhep Qosja: "Kosovo, a Big Courtroom"]

[Text] Following the historical changes which have occurred in the countries of Eastern and central Europe, even in Serbian politics there is ever more persistent talk about the democratization of society, but not about democracy as yet. It is evident that the Serbian political oligarchy is exceedingly interested in persuading the world public, now that it has failed to convince the domestic public, of its sincere democratic intentions. But who is going to believe the democratic intentions of those who are the only ones in Yugoslavia who until yesterday were resolutely opposed to multiparty pluralism, without which there cannot even be any talk of political democracy. It is evident in Kosovo that democratization is a small pearl in the Serbian political necklace, since in Kosovo Serbian policy always displays its true intentions and methods. The trial of Azem Villasi and the other Trepca leaders, who to many minds in the country and in the world (except the philosophical writer Ljubomir Tadic and leaders of the Kosovo Polje "truth" rally) recall the infamous rigged trials of Stalinism, would compromise even far more meaningful processes of democratization than the one being talked about in Serbia. And the trial of Azem Villasi is a Stalinist political trial not only because of the way the indictment is written, but also because of the ironclad police-state context in which it is taking place and in which the law-governed state is being replaced by emergency powers.

Political trials have been part of Kosovo's everyday life for almost nine years now. A few days before the trial of Azem Villasi and the others in Titova Mitrovica began, it was announced that similar trials were being prepared in other Kosovo cities as well: Fadil Hoxha in Prizren, Ilijaz Kurtishi in Pec, and Ekrem Arifi in Gnjilane. These trials of the former leaders of Kosovo, announced with loud fanfare and representing a particular aspect of the intimidation of the Albanian people, have not begun yet. Perhaps they seemed like too much even for those arranging them: After all, all of Kosovo has been turned into a courtroom, into a large courtroom in which the Albanian people, its past and present, its old age and its youth, are being tried. Especially its youth. And that before the eyes of democratic Europe, which is celebrating the democratic reawakenings in Eastern Europe. And which is experiencing a tardy regret that it allowed the rule of Ceausescu and the existence of Ceauschwitz in its heartland!

Surrounded by Mediocrities

Just as the regression of Kosovo from the standpoint of constitutional law did not begin on the day when the proposed amendments to the Constitution of Socialist

Republic [SR] Serbia and Kosovo were adopted, that is, in March 1989, so the political tragedy of Azem Vllasi did not begin on the day when he was arrested. If the regression of Kosovo from the standpoint of constitutional law began when Serbia suspended in practice the bodies of government in Kosovo, the political tragedy of Azem Vllasi and the other Albanian politicians began when the demonstrations of the Albanian university students in 1981 were proclaimed counterrevolution and when he began to use that antidemocratic and Bolshevik term in his increasingly successful political career. That was when he began to build his career, mainly by reiterating the slogan with which Serbian policy "proved" the counterrevolution in Kosovo, never questioning either its objectives, which were becoming increasingly far-reaching in Yugoslavia, nor its methods and measures, which were becoming more and more difficult for the Albanians in Kosovo.

However, one should also include in Azem Vllasi's political misfortune those political and professional personnel whom he found in place or whom he promoted when he became Kosovo's leading politician: semiliterate Partizans whom time had already run over; social climbers who had learned to read and write in haste and who received their university diplomas by taking examinations in the offices of corrupt professors and who no longer were equal to the situation in which Kosovo found itself: undeserving academics and other servile intellectuals—monuments to all the changes of political direction. Intelligent, able, dynamic, but surrounded by mediocrities who were not up to his level, Azem Vllasi was in fact almost isolated. But that still is not all.

Azem Vllasi also prepared his own political tragedy to some extent with his cultural dogmatism, his particularly restrictive attitude toward history. Since he neither knew the history of Serbian political thought nor of Serbian-Albanian relations, Azem Vllasi was not able to recognize in the unprecedented anti-Albanian propaganda which the Serbian news media began immediately after 1981 the share of those political factors which were recognizable from the very outset: the share of the ideology of the Serbian Orthodox Church, as the "soul of the Serbian people"—which has traditionally regarded the Albanians as Kosovo's threatening element; the share of the policy of Nikola Pasic, in which the Albanians were most frequently proclaimed unenlightened tribes to whom the legal and moral standards of civilized society were alien, which is why they needed to be enlightened more frequently with emergency powers; the share of the methods of the Serbian Cultural Club worked out in the well-known 1937 project of Vasa Cubrilovic—in which diabolical measures were proposed as a solution to what was referred to as the Arnaut question: creation of a suitable hysteria, pressure of the government apparatus, and the provoking of rebellions that would be drowned in blood!

In a political climate in which the saber-words counter-revolution, irredentism, nationalism, and later separatism and terrorism produced a horrible din that smothered the real truth about Kosovo and in which the rights and freedoms of many Albanians suffered, Azem Vllasi did not notice (how could he have noticed!) that even that degree of equality of the Albanian people as a whole which had been achieved earlier was beginning to suffer. As a consequence of a policy which looked for the culprit in the past and in the present, which replaced democracy with differentiation, in which the Albanian people, for all practical purposes had become a collective dissident with a gag in its mouth, it is no wonder that Kosovo's national product soon became the persecuted Albanian: expelled from the LC, suspended or discharged from his job, removed from the teaching process, boycotted by his neighbors or relatives in the local community, deprived of the right to secondary schooling, deprived of the right to study at the university, called in for questioning, called in for an informative conversation, admonished, taken into custody, punished for a misdemeanor, prosecuted in criminal court, and finally convicted of a crime. More than its poor industrial products that were going to other parts of the state, Kosovo was exporting convicted Albanians to Yugoslavia's other prisons. Azem Vllasi irreproachably conducted the Kosovo policy which had in fact been defined by Serbia, but had been adopted by Yugoslavia. And he conducted it sincerely, faithfully, selflessly, horribly resentful of his own people, but he probably conducted it because the voice of the party continued to be the voice of the Almighty for him! For all those reasons he would in time become the most valued Albanian politician in Serbia, Serbian newspapermen would write quite a few flattering words about him, and he would be praised in public by Serbian politicians. However, Azem Vllasi was not to enjoy that kind of political favor for long.

Victim of a Serbian Ultimatum

Thanks to the all-out assistance of traditionally influential institutions even in politics, in actuality the centers of ideology in Serbia—the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the Association of Serbian Writers, and the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbian leadership saw that the maintenance of tension in Kosovo could be used with great effectiveness to serve the needs of Serbian expansionist strategy in Yugoslavia, that is, to revive the option of Yugoslavia as an expanded Serbia. The demands being put on Kosovo and the Kosovo leadership began to grow and become richer as this awareness developed and became enriched! It is not important at all that these demands were objectively unrealizable: The important thing was that they existed. After all, their unrealizability was in fact counted on. That is why the Serbian leadership will not be satisfied tomorrow if the demands put on the Kosovo leadership today are met. The Kosovo situation, which is thought to be more or less tolerable today, is seen in terms of a dramatic tomorrow.

In Serbian propaganda, Kosovo has become a new Skadar on the Bojana: What is built in the daytime to meet the needs of that propaganda is torn down at night! This was a policy that soon would be called the policy of the "easily promised speed." It was a policy of ultimatum which thrust Albanian political personnel to the wall: either/or! This was a policy of destroying and doing away with Albanian political intelligence and the Albanian participants in politics! This was a policy which did not want to hear about facts, truth, or justice. At a time when Serbs and Albanians were facing a test of history as to how to arrange their mutual relations in a more permanent way, this was a policy that destroyed the conditions for dialogue, which actually excluded the Albanians from the dialogue. Is there anyone left today who does not see clearly that this kind of political strategy was served by the Belgrade branch office in Kosovo Polje, which was to be the point of origin of the trains of nationalism and the solidarity rallies, which would deepen the political, ethnic, and social antagonisms in Kosovo, which, by exporting the "truth" about Kosovo, would fan the flames of interethnic severity in Yugoslavia, which in the name of an antibureaucratic revolution would give legitimacy to a markedly cruel bureaucratic generation in Serbia, which, to replace the communist authoritarianism that had existed until yesterday, would strengthen Serbian ethnic authoritarianism today? It could be seen from their demands from the very beginning that the purpose of the Kosovo Polje rally leaders was to suspend the bodies of government in Kosovo and to politically wound and then politically execute Albanian personnel in the Opstina Committee of Pristina, in the provincial committee, in the large combines in Obilic and in Trepca.

Presumably, it was there in Kosovo Polje where the politically experienced Azem Vllasi experienced his first public belittlement, insult, and blackmail and understood the importance even for Kosovo of the idea which Jovan Veselinov used more than 40 years ago to explain interethnic tensions in Vojvodina: Here, "Serbian chauvinism is most dangerous, because it is economically the strongest and because it is associated with Belgrade." When he realized the importance of everything he had heard in Kosovo Polje, when he realized the importance of everything that had been shouted in the solidarity meetings in Vojvodina and Montenegro, when he realized that those slogans termed peripheral by Serbian politicians could in fact be the essence of a policy, when he realized that that policy of the "easily promised speed," behind which stood ultimatums and aggressiveness—when he realized that all this was leading to the destruction of Albanian political, economic, and educational personnel of Kosovo, an essential regression of Kosovo in terms of constitutional law, and finally a repartitioning of AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia] Yugoslavia, Azem Vllasi began slowly to stand up straight and to think with his own head. Then, it seems, Azem Vllasi decided not to cross the Rubicon in a policy which was leading the nationality to which he belonged into an ever more

discriminated position. He simply did not want to be the tool of a policy whose validity he had begun to suspect, a suspicion supported by an increasing number of facts.

Why Was Vllasi Brought Down?

However, Azem Vllasi had his own position toward that ultimative policy of the "easily promised speed" not only as a representative of the Albanian people, but still more as a sincere follower of the policy of ethnic equality which he would refer to as Tito's policy, from which the Serbian policy toward the Albanians has ever more meaningfully and decisively distanced itself. The Serbian leadership, which set down the policy concerning Kosovo and which until yesterday had given favorable marks to the work of Azem Vllasi in carrying out that policy in Kosovo, all of a sudden began to give him bad marks and to call that policy, which actually was its own policy, a mistaken and failed policy. In that attitude toward Azem Vllasi, they received rapid and effective help from certain Kosovo leaders who could translate into material terms the meaning of the thought: Until the sun goes down for someone, the dawn does not come for someone else! And why not? Azem Vllasi had already been marked for political execution: The hunting season had been opened, and there was no closed season for him. And sacrificing Azem Vllasi's freedom and the constitutional destiny of the Albanian people became a condition for someone's political advancement to the top position of leadership.

Much earlier, the Albanian people themselves had realized far more than what Azem Vllasi would realize following the meetings in Kosovo Polje, the solidarity rallies, and the eighth meeting. But they spoke out only when they saw that the decisionmaking concerning the political fate of Azem Vllasi was also deciding the constitutional destiny of a people. This means that with the gatherings in November, before giving support to Azem Vllasi, the Albanian people wanted, first, to reiterate the political will which it had expressed in the public discussion of the constitutional amendments which Serbia for all practical purposes did not wish to acknowledge, thus renouncing the democratic principle: Whoever puts up a constitution for public discussion has a duty to respect its results, and second, to withdraw legitimacy from those to whom it had not given it and who raised themselves up on the funeral prepared for the political career of Azem Vllasi and the constitutional funeral of Kosovo's autonomy dating from 1974. The Serbian leadership, however, was determined not to acknowledge the right of the Albanian people to decide their own destiny in terms of constitutional law and politics, just as it was determined to impose on it leaders against whom they had declared themselves. After all, the Serbian leadership was determined, perhaps for the first time since the war, to conduct its policy in Kosovo regardless of the political will of the Albanian people. That is why the gatherings in November and the strikes in February, although democratic institutions, were

described as yet another Albanian counterrevolution: the third or fourth or who knows which counterrevolution in Kosovo since 1981!

With brutal words in November 1988 and brutal means in March 1989, Albanians have been denied that right—the right of assembly and the right to organize—which is accorded others without objection. We have become a people prohibited still more! And then came the emergency powers! And then came the arrest of Azem Vllasi! And then came the arrest of the other Albanian political and economic personnel, university students, and workers! And then came the infamous cases of “isolation” of economists, engineers, educationists, and creators. And then came the most vicious waves of the differentiation! And then came the most numerous firings! Kosovo also had its Tiananmen—before the one in China. Adoption of the amendments to the Constitution of SR Serbia was prepared, that is, as Serbia saw fit! The constitutional destiny of the Albanian people has been thrust backward! The King of Sheba has ordered our time to come to a stop! That will take care of you. The essence of autonomy has been reduced to the cultural dimension, its functional liquidation has continued with new laws and the so-called communities (the electric power industry, the university): The very bottom of the barrel has been reached in the negative selection of Albanian political personnel, which was so obvious in the election of Albanian delegates to the Congress of the Serbian LC; political liquidation of Albanian economic personnel is continuing; Albanian political representatives, co-opted by the will of the Serbian leadership, are being used more and more in Serbia's political showdown with the Slovenian leadership, which is the only one in Yugoslavia to have tried to speak about Kosovo and Albanians with some kind of objectivity; Kosovo's economic development is being directed toward the social segregation of Albanians; the repeal of the Law on Revision of Allocation of Land Colonists is opening up the way to recolonization of Kosovo; the political, economic, and social inequality of Albanians is deepening more and more; the human rights of Albanians depend entirely on current politics; thus, a mental state of hopelessness and lack of a future is being created and is having an ever greater influence on the migrations of Albanians to the West! Can it be that Azem Vllasi was brought down because he was considered an obstacle to all this?!

Victims and Culprits

Azem Vllasi (and the 14 Trepca leaders) is being charged as an inspirer and organizer of the gathering of Albanians in November 1988 and of the strikes in February (1989). Is not Azem Vllasi's indictment repeating the scenario of the political executions which are already well-known in history? Only Vishinsky and his fellow judges attributed that kind of superhuman power to seduce the masses to the “counterrevolutionaries,” to the “capitalist agents,” to the “terrorists,” and to the “plotters against Stalin.” The motives behind the gathering of Albanians in November and the strikes in

February were in terms of politics, social welfare, and history far more justified than support for an individual ever could be.

The amendments to the Constitution of SR Serbia, which have essentially restricted the constitutional status of Kosovo, are an antihistorical act for the Albanian people, which is a historical people, since they signify a marked regression in its freedom. That is why reducing the political will and consciousness of the Albanian people to the position of one man is to underestimate the historical maturity of that people. And still more: The trial of Azem Vllasi for expressing the free will of the Albanian people through democratic institutions such as gatherings and strikes objectively signifies a trial of the Albanian people for something it is legitimately entitled to as a democratic right: not to agree with restriction of its own freedom, that is, with regression in its history. With the gatherings in November and the strikes in February, the Albanian people did not manage to protect those rights which had been guaranteed by the 1974 Constitution.

Viewed from the standpoint of current politics, those gatherings and strikes were in vain, but from the historical standpoint they were necessary: With them, the Albanian people did not protect that degree of freedom which it had as a collectivity, but it did protect the principle of rights and its historical dignity, which its ruling bureaucratic stratum had already insulted with its historical irresponsibility.

To be forcibly expelled from political life against the will of the Albanian people, and then to be arrested in the context of emergency powers, constitute a great personal and family tragedy for Azem Vllasi. If there is any consolation for that tragedy, then it is the awareness that his arrest, and now his trial as well, have helped to part the curtains behind which the world has clearly seen what is happening in Kosovo, that the rights and freedoms of the Albanian people are actually being convicted in Kosovo. After all, in Titova Mitrovica, where Azem Vllasi and the 14 leaders from Trepca are being tried, a spirit has been resurrected once again, the spirit of a Stalinism that historically has been utterly defeated in this year's democratic spring in Eastern and central Europe. Since here in Titova Mitrovica, through the fate of Azem Vllasi, those who are guilty are once again being treated as victims, and the violence of the state is being treated as lawful! The political tragedy of Azem Vllasi de facto bears the imprint of the policy of the Serbian leader, the present president of the Presidium of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, but de jure the imprint of the State Presidency of Yugoslavia. I do not seek a pardon for Azem Vllasi. As a citizen of Yugoslavia, I would like to remind Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Serbia, of a thought uttered long ago: “The person who commits an injustice is more unfortunate than the one who suffers it.” And as a citizen of Yugoslavia I demand from the State Presidency of Yugoslavia that it protect the democratic rights and freedoms of the Albanian people which it protects for others.

In this case, it will necessarily protect the freedom of Azem Vilasi and the other defendants in Titova Mitrovica as well.

And all those Albanians whose freedom has been taken away by the either/or policy.

Popularity of Radical Serb, Croat Figures

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[Article by Milan Jajcinovic]

[Text] In Shakespeare's "Julius Caesar," church bells ring, although the ancient Romans did not have them. Schiller's Wallenstein speaks about a lightning rod, but it did not even exist in his time.... In today's Yugoslavia, we have been witnesses to anachronism of another kind—attempts to circulate the past in the present and in the future. That is why mythical heroes, emperors, and bans, "bourgeois politicians" and overthrown dynasties, compromised policies and moldy ideas are parading on the political stage. In short, an invasion of the past.

In his political "nacertanija" [outlines], that ideological mishmash, Vuk Draskovic speaks even of the Kingdom of Serbia "headed by the hereditary dynasty of Karadjordjevic." And even though one gave up long ago being surprised at anything in this country, disbelief does nevertheless spring up and turn in an instant into the question of whether he is really serious. How does anyone who thinks that way perceive the world around him in general? Naum with the Karadjordjevic is tragicomical, as indeed is Draskovic, who displays an apostle's ethnic enthusiasm. But it is obvious that the meeting in Nova Pazova (and those who think like Draskovic who were not at the meeting) do not perceive this business of the Karadjordjevic as something comical, nor do they consider the originator of that conception as someone they should feel sorry for.

If we lived in a more normal country, probably no one would care a fig for Vuk Draskovic's political frustrations. The regime would leave him in peace to preach his simple-minded nationalistic propositions, to give evidence as a political specimen of how lost he is in time. But we unfortunately do not live in such a country. And Vuk Draskovic will be at the center of attention so long as there are those who think like he does. And there are incomparably more of them today than earlier. As a matter of fact, people who think like that become more noticeable as soon as their number exceeds the size of some exclusive sect. Draskovic and his ilk come from a very deep collective uneasiness, from some feeling of ethnic frustration and "an injustice that has been done." They bring together those who are fiercest, those with the deepest "bruises on their souls," maintaining that they are capable of bringing about even that kind of tragicomic intention of a return of the Karadjordjevic. Draskovic's people obviously think that there is a Serbian need for the myth of "Uncle Peter" and the "dynasty in peasant sandals."

The Courts, Not the Party

Certainly, there exist even fanatic royalists who would like to see the king's return. And there is talk about establishing the Radical Party of Nikola Pasic, the legendary Baja, for whom, as Krleza once said, there exists only "one and only one cliche: a holy Orthodox icon with a votive candle, a railroad car of the Serbian State Railroad loaded with Russian gold coin, Cyrillic script and a huge letter on the policeman's shoulder board, and anyone who doesn't like it is a German and Austria invented him!" Until quite recently it was Nikola Pasic who was glorified as the greatest Serbian politician. But with the emergence of Slobodan Milosevic the radical leader has lost that primacy. But his myth has not been destroyed. Not at all, there are even prospects for the former radical slogan "Radical alteration of all injustices" to become the rallying cry of adherents of the Radical Party once again. It supposedly will be revived. We say "revived," since in the technical legal sense (just like the Croatian Peasant Party) it never was abolished, but died out "spontaneously."

In Zagreb, the Croatian Peasant Party has already been revived, so it is possible that the Serbian Radical Party and the Croatian Peasant Party could once again be rivals in the struggle for power. If someone who died about 60 years ago should come back, he would think that nothing had even changed. The question as to who needs those old rival parties today is not really the most opportune. It is obvious that someone does, although it is difficult to escape the impression that one is now being offered something that outlived its usefulness long ago for both the Serbs and Croats. Instead of being left to history and memories, they wanted to revive. If those who mean to do this succeed, it really will be interesting to see who will be their most distinguished members and how many votes they will get. This will say a lot about the present time and about the state of its spirits. The spirit of the time that lies ahead of those seems to have been read with lucidity by the late Professor Vanja Sutlic, who said as he observed the inception of the new parties and had a presentiment of what was coming: "Surely, I won't be a member of the Peasant Party!"

No one contests the entry of the HSS [Croatian Peasant Party] and the Radical Party into the political competition, but it is hard to believe that they will be successful in it. Nor should this be denied Draskovic and his Serbian National Renewal [SNO], nor the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ]. But such intentions do exist, especially concerning the SNO and HDZ. There was a public hue and cry against the HDZ even before it was established. Just recently against the SNO. For all their differences, the feature of being anachronistic is the main thing they have in common. But even they are addressing someone. Which shows that we are still far from contemporary life in the rest of the world. This is confirmed not only by Vuk Draskovic and Franjo Tudjman, but also by those who are attacking them. No one, of course, is denying anyone the right to contest and criticize their programs, neither the party nor its branch,

the Socialist Alliance. But these attacks cannot be conducted from arbitrary positions, as though the party was still the only recognized possessor of truth and intelligence. Draskovic, Tudjman, and others may be this or that, may be politically out-of-step or obstinate, but that is not the party's affair. It need not agree with it, but that does not entitle it to set itself up above everything else and play the priest. And if they have gone too far, that is not the party's problem, but that of the courts. There are laws. If Draskovic and Tudjman have broken them, then they should be tried by the court, not by the party.

For the Cross and Justice

Vuk Draskovic has created an odium for a segment of the public with his bearded ideas. So has Franjo Tudjman. They seem to have been eagerly awaited, they seem to have become a propitious excuse for the government to create public hysteria through its spokesman, and then to issue this message to the public: "So there you see what an opposition looks like!" Then, the most zealous demanded that their activity be prohibited. And once they are banned, then it would be easier to ban others as well. The dogmatists, not only those in the party, are rubbing their hands and rejoicing. The situation has begun to play into their hands once again. The stars seem to be looking down on them more kindly. Certainly, there still are those who are sincerely concerned about what the leaders of the HDZ and SNO are preaching. They all know that the entire political opposition cannot be reduced to two names and judged on the basis of them. But that does not bother the dogmatists, nor do they steer clear of generalization, and so they proclaim everyone to be the same, and they are trying to create in the public the impression that the opposition has compromised itself in advance, that it "leads to civil war."

The opposition in Croatia earned its first public points with Ban Jelacic. For all the good intentions (and their realization), this was still a case of using the past as an instrument (which is inevitable when important hunks have been chopped out of history). Which is why there were more than a few people asking who needs Ban Jelacic today. The ban's spokesmen were louder and more in keeping with the political trend. But that trend began long before that. First, the relics of Prince Lazar from Kosovo traveled from monastery to monastery as in a relay, as a reminder of the eternal gratitude to the martyrs of Kosovo and of devotion to the "Serbian Jerusalem." And no sooner had Lazar come to rest (presumably forever) in Ravanica, than the "lord," King Nikola of Montenegro, arrived. And that was the handsome conclusion to a year of returning to the past. A year in which the sirens wailed once again, in which there was a celebration on Gazimestan (Who else in any other place celebrates lost battles?) and the demand was made to restore to institutions, streets, and cities the names they had once had.

Certainly, the past cannot be erased. It can always be felt, even when one does not want to feel it. Today, in Yugoslavia, it seems, it is more perceptible than ever. To

be sure, perhaps only that recent past was better represented. The cult of the Partisan struggle, its symbols and iconography were to be seen on every corner. It was not, of course, the same as in the Soviet Union or in Albania, but it was still above the level where it became irritating. When the revolutionary ornamentation began to crumble, the zealous political archeologists began to dig deeper and pull out some kind of amorphous shapes which they presented as valuable artifacts of the nationality that had never been surpassed. There began a digging up of the Kosovo myth and a glorification of the cult of Kosovo such as had not been seen since the creation of the old Yugoslavia and its Saint Vitus' Day mystique.

It is interesting that people from the Dinarids are even today, just as once was the case, the most persistent in propagating that myth (Simo Dubajic, Jovan Opacic, Vuk Draskovic, Vojislav Seselj, and others). Which is no wonder, since they come from regions where life with the past is almost taken for granted. The songs glorifying the acts of heroism, sacrifices, and suffering of Kosovo sung to the gusla lie deep in those violent people from the Dinarids, so that it is understandable that they should—certainly by their own choice—fight for the "honorable cross and golden freedom."

Out of Step

The Croatian turn to the past is of a somewhat different nature. It has always been a struggle for certain century-old "Croatian rights." This is not a euphoric past to which toasts are made. It could rather be said that it is looked on to some extent resignedly, with an admixture of sickly sweet pride and the now proverbial sign of contempt made in the pocket [with the thumb thrust between the first two fingers], and turned toward "those over there" ("Let their devil take them, take them far away!"). But that "but why do they torture us" is supposed to testify to our own ethnic superiority, and therefore self-love as well. This love of Croatism is still being reproduced. This was to be seen at Christmas and New Year's, when groups of members of the jeans generation, utterly out of keeping with the image, tra-la-la-ed "The Vila of Velebit" and strained their vocal chords singing "Rise Up, Ban." It is obvious that we are entering a time of various symbioses, that we will have tales about Jelacic-ban and Tsar Lazar and computer software living side by side.

The times have changed greatly after all. There is evidence of this change in just a small detail: There was a time when you could find yourself behind bars for singing "Rise Up, Ban." That can no longer happen today, although there are still those who think that singing it constitutes nationalism. The speech that Slavica Bajan made at one time in the Croatian Assembly has also been christened nationalism by a large segment of the public. For months now, her name has been dragged through the newspaper columns. This public torture over several months has brought her to the edge of a mental breakdown. And all because she

expressed as a delegate in the assembly an opinion which is judged (even) in the media campaign to be against the Serbs. Let us recall: Slavica Bajan demanded that even Serbs be deleted from the constitutional definition of Croatia as a constituent unless other nationalities (aside from Croats) whose homeland is in Croatia are also mentioned by name. And after that the hue and cry began.

What is most absurd in Slavica Bajan's proposal is the fact that it is not out of step or in contradiction to the times. Nevertheless, these are only our times, which are somehow unable to reach the level of the contemporary world. Had we reached it, no one would even have taken her proposal seriously. Then Croatia—even though the other republics have remained enslaved by the principle of national states—would have been defined as the state of the citizens of Croatia. That did not occur, because it was probably felt that then it might be interpreted that Croatia would not be the state of the Croats. As though they would have drowned in the generality of the definition. As though the very name Croatia did not also signify to whom it belongs. It is not, after all, called Laponia or Flamania, but Croatia (the land that belongs to the Croats!). But that is not how the thinking ran, though it should have. There were models, but they were forgotten. Perhaps people should only have recalled how General de Gaulle called for resistance to the fascist invasion. He addressed the populace over the radio with

the words: "Citizens of France, your homeland is threatened!" He did not say Frenchmen! That was half a century ago!

Yugoslavia seems unable to get in step with the times. And it hardly will be able to so quickly. Still and all, the countries into which socialism was brought on the tanks of the Red Army will leap over it in their rush to be up-to-date. That is, Yugoslavia as a whole is today perceived as an anachronism. Asleep for years in its own narcissism—"the first country of self-management socialism," the "leader of the nonalignment movement," a country with economic growth, "where the nationality question had been resolved"—has been completely asleep. A large number of its joints, cemented for decades by the Partizan triumph, by an ever better life and by the personal charisma of Josip Broz Tito have let go as time passed. Not a single new one has been put in place. The cracks widened especially after Tito's death. It was followed by confusion, a loss of bearings, a worried state of mind and anxiety. The crisis further compounded the frustration. The future was frightening and still is. A return to the past, as something more or less familiar, emerged as the first solution so as to evade the "aggressive despair." That is why many people went back, and many are still going back to their roots and the past. They are becoming morbidly sentimental or indeed rigid and severe, incomparably more receptive to that Balkan "We will shed a bit of your blood, my eagle," than to Voltaire's "What you say makes me sick, but I will always defend your right to say it." The contemporary world frightens Yugoslavia, but it also offers a challenge. That is why its tomorrow may be both tomorrow and yesterday.

HUNGARY**Counterfeit U.S. Currency Discovered**

*25000680G Szeged CSONGRAD MEGYEI HIRLAP
in Hungarian 10 Feb 90 p 4*

[Article by Peter Zrinyi: "Twenty Dollar Bills With Washington's Portrait—County Police Headquarters Investigates New Counterfeit Bank Notes"]

[Excerpts] A man from Kecskemet went shopping in Szeged and found something he liked in the Salco Shop foreign exchange agency at No. 40 Lenin Boulevard. He handed over a \$100 bill as payment, and received 13.50 Deutsche marks in change. The rest was given to him in bills bearing the number 20. He looked, then found that the rest of the money was also in the form of West German currency, while he was entitled to receive dollars, 80 dollars to be exact. He spoke up, of course—he's lucky he noticed the situation. In return the cashier apologized and exchanged the four bills for dollars, in the same way, four \$20 bills. He went home, then took another look at the money he had received in exchange. He found that something was not right about the dollars. Although both the numbers and the letters indicated that these were \$20 bills, next to the president's portrait one could clearly read in English the word ONE. True, this was visible only at that spot, but it was visible there. He went to the police station, and the suspect bills were returned to Szeged, to the economic protection unit of County Police Headquarters, according to the profile.

It is known where the money originates from, and soon a professional opinion will be issued by the bank: All four bills are counterfeit, printed uniformly, using the same technique. They are of exactly the same kind that viewers could see one evening last week on television, when an attache case filled with counterfeit \$20 bills was presented. The counterfeit bills were manufactured using special printing technology, and genuine \$1 bills. By using a special process the numbers in the corners, the letters in the center stating the amount, and the signature below the presidential portrait were exchanged. Thus, president Jackson's name was placed under Washington's portrait, and to the right of the portrait the word ONE can be clearly seen, even though the word TWENTY up front appears to be perfect.

On the reverse side of the bill the picture of the White House is entirely washed, even though the design would have to be very accurate. [passage omitted]

Only one person had used dollars for payment, and because of the sum of the purchase, he had received an invoice showing the name and personal data of the buyer. It became clear [passage omitted] that 51-year-old Sandor Barna (No. 2 Bartok Bela Square, Szeged) made payment using five counterfeit \$20 bills, of which four were returned to the shopper from Kecskemet. [passage omitted]

Barna told police that on 6 or 7 February he sold a golden ring to someone in the Romanian city of Arad for \$100, and that he had received the five counterfeit bills in payment. (Obviously Barna did not notice that the bills were counterfeit, otherwise he would not have accepted them.) [passage omitted]

The head of the economic protection unit of the county police ordered an investigation in the case, at first only to establish facts in regard to the issuance of the counterfeit money. Since then, Sandor Barna is being investigated as a suspect, and a criminal proceeding has been initiated against him. [passage omitted]

We are not at all certain that the \$20 bills bearing Washington's portrait are from Arad, and that only five of them came to Szeged, of which four are with the police.

Lower Soviet Demand For Industrial Products Detailed

*25000680H Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
1 Mar 90 pp 1, 5*

[Article by Arpad Hajnoczy: "What Comes After the Bus?"]

[Text] Enterprises still believe that the drastic reduction in ruble exports is only a bad dream, which will pass upon awakening. In this case, however, the dream has not gone away, because the "bad dream" is reality: All the consequences of delayed industrial development are piling up on the enterprises all at once.

Uncertainties in production and an increasing number of forced leaves characterize the vehicle, electronics, machine tool, and instrumentation industries, all of which are sensitive to ruble exports. As of this printing, in the vehicle industry alone some 10,000 persons have been sent off to take forced leaves of absence, but several enterprises are pondering the possibility of stopping production. A large number of the enterprises are being forced to produce for inventory while struggling with payment difficulties, and they can only hope to receive export licenses in the near future.

No progress was made in the Hungarian-Soviet mercantile trade negotiations, and if indications are correct and Soviet contingents are further tightened, competent estimates project that directly or indirectly between 70,000 and 80,000 workplaces will become superfluous. In response to the increased Hungarian trade surplus the Soviet Union intends to reduce primarily its machine industry imports. At the end of January, Soviet experts proposed a 1.2 billion ruble contingent. This represents a significant reduction: Thirty percent of food industry machinery, 70 percent of communications implements and equipment, and 45 percent of the computer equipment would be cut. Demand for machine tools, foundry machinery, floating cranes, chemical industry machines, painting equipment, and vacuum technology machinery dropped practically to zero, representing 130 million rubles.

With the ruble export stop in the background, the Hungarian vehicle manufacturing troika stalled to varying degrees due to solvency and delivery problems. Csepel Auto was first, followed by Raba, and then Ikarus production stopped, and thus the vehicle industry fell into a hopeless situation. The new Ikarus crisis represents a model, and from this standpoint it makes no difference how unexpected that crisis was.

The domestic single market, monoculture bus manufacturing carries the burden of all of the consequences produced by decades of industrial development. Doubtless, as long as the energy and raw material ratio received

in exchange for the buses was favorable, this may have appeared to be a rational industrial development strategy. Nevertheless, the vulnerability of this strategy had been visible for years and was obvious. The monopolistic situation seems to be taking revenge upon itself: Many years of comfortable product development, defensive commercial and pricing policies to which experts and enterprise subcontractors have called attention several times on the pages of FIGYELO, now present a boomerang effect. And this is not changed even by the fact that in all of this the government's industrial, trade, and subsidy policies obviously played a significant role, in addition to enterprise management.

1990 Soviet Demand and 1989 Contingents By Chief Product Groups

Product Group	1989 Soviet Contingent (in millions of rubles)	1990 Soviet Demand (in millions of rubles)	Affected Enterprises
Cables and conduits	8.65	0	Hungarian Cable Industry Works
Foundry machinery and equipment	27.9	0	DIGEP, CSM Egyedi Machine Works, Shredding Machine Factory
Crude oil exploration equipment	43.5	26.5	MMG Automatics Works, Vegyepszer, Idex
Cranes and hoisting machines	40.4	8	Ganz Danubius
Oceangoing floating cranes	22.5	0	Ganz Danubius
Food industry machinery	90.1	50	ELGEPE, AGRIKON, Sophiane Machine Factory, Idex, Lang Machine Factory
Refrigeration equipment	13	10.1	Tata Refrigeration Technology Cooperative
Light industry machinery	37.6	30.7	Csepel Rugev, Light Industry Machine Manufacturing Enterprise
Chemical industry technology equipment	26.2	1.3	Lampert Chemical Industry Machine Factory, Budapest Chemical Industry Machine Factory, CSM Egyedi Machine Factory, April 4 Machine Industry Works, Communications Industry Machine Factory
Commercial and catering industry equipment	20.9	7.3	Keripar
Communications technology implements and equipment	233.2	42.0	BRG, Videoton, EVIG, Mechanical Works, BAG, Orion, Tungsram, Hungarian Cable Industry Works, Fine Mechanics Enterprise
Painting equipment	35	0	Propellant Works and Painting Equipment Factory
Equipment to manufacture specialized technology	61.7	40	MEV, Tungsram, Electrical Measuring Instruments Factory
Vacuum technology manufacturing equipment	14.7	1.5	Tungsram
Cable industry equipment	12.6	12.3	DIGEP, Pest Area Machine Factory
Medical treatment implements	50.7	63.3	Gamma, Medicor, Labor, MIM
Computer technology implements	210.3	70.2	Videoton, MOM, Labor MTM, MMG Automatics Works
Agricultural machinery	57.8	17.8	Agrikon, Debrecen Mezogep, Kuhne
Buses	473.8	330	Ikarus
Front axle and rear bridge	65.3	70	Raba
Spare bus parts	255.4	200	Ikarus, Csepel Auto, Raba

Ikarus has lost its maneuvering capacity, and one can learn lessons from this. According to general practice based on business policies, an enterprise is capable of avoiding crisis situations if it changes strategies before the emergency bells begin ringing. It is very likely that at Ikarus a change in strategy was delayed, and thus its situation was similar to that of the chess player who is about to lose the game: It had only one step left, but check mate was certain thereafter.

It is part of the truth that the crisis situation in which the vehicle industry finds itself did not result exclusively from the enterprise strategy that was supported by the government; changes in Soviet export licensing procedures also had a large impact.

"Ruble export stop" confronted Ikarus and other enterprises with an accomplished fact. And it is questionable whether it is possible to conduct rational enterprise management in the framework of the quarterly export licensing system. This is not likely, and it may be ruled out with regard to products involving long lead and manufacturing time. The ruble surplus that has increased rapidly since the beginning of the year cannot be reduced without taking drastic steps. (Incidentally, part of this export represents shipments withheld last year, and carried over to 1990.) But in this regard, a method more appropriate to the character of enterprise management must be found as soon as possible.

Ikarus sent its workers home on a forced leave of absence. It will pay 80 percent of the wages for idle work to workers who are forced to take a rest. This means two things. Firstly, that the specific wage and capital cost of the remaining production will well increase, meaning that competitiveness will deteriorate. Secondly, that wages will be paid out without performance at a time when the government is using every means to fight inflation in earnings.

And finally, one cannot assess the negative multiplying effect of "export stop." In the bus example the ripple effects go back to the sheet metal manufacturer Duna Iron Works, through the rubber and glass industries, to the paint industry and to countless subcontractors with increasing force, and one may be concerned that all of this will disorganize the economy. This is because these measures have not been preceded by a thorough analysis of the effects on real processes. So, not only Ikarus is at issue.

GE Appointed Tungsram President Introduced

25000680D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
1 Mar 90 p 6

[Article by Csaba Egerszegi: "After Successful Change of Ownership: Millions of Dollars for Tungsram"]

[Text] The new president of Tungsram, Incorporated, 54-year-old Gyorgy Varga, introduced himself at a press conference held Wednesday [28 February]. The executive of Hungarian origin has served General Electric [GE], the third largest U.S. company, for more than two decades.

Tungsram, Incorporated Chairman of the Board Andras Gabor took part in yesterday's briefing. He discussed Tungsram's accomplishments of last year. According to his statement in 1989, the firm achieved the highest level of profits in its history. The 1.4 billion forints of profit is seven times as much as the 200 million forints recorded in 1988. The number of employees was reduced by more than 800, and productivity has increased by 28.6 percent. Exports subject to settlement in convertible currencies showed the greatest growth; the increase amounts to 30 percent based on current exchange rates. Gabor credited these results mainly to the successful change in ownership, because the establishment of a stock corporation fundamentally changed the company's financial situation. The amount of borrowings and interest expenses declined.

The new president has been working in Ujpest for three weeks. According to his initial impressions, the prevailing mood at Tungsram may be characterized by pessimism and lethargy. He regards the establishment of an optimistic atmosphere, and obtaining the stockholders' confidence, as one of his most important tasks. On the other hand, a reduction in force cannot be avoided; the president regarded the present employment freeze and the preferential early retirement program as a so-called soft program. There are too many of us, Varga reasoned. The lighting source branch of GE employs 20,000 people. These persons produce a value of \$2.2 billion. At the same time, Tungsram's 18,000 employees produced only a \$300 million value.

Plans call for GE to invest \$50 million in Tungsram by 1994. Responding to NEPSZABADSAG, the president said that this amount is small rather than large. Gabor added that the enterprise is technically incapable of utilizing a larger amount than that for investment purposes.

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